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Abstract
Chapter 1
Studies of airline mergers have largely focused on measuring the impact of mergers
on average airfares. As a result, they may not sufficiently reveal the full range of
price effects given the complexity of this industry. To address such industry intricacy,
I investigate the distributions of prices of merging firms and their rivals in response
to the United-Continental merger on two types of routes: those primarily consisting
of price-sensitive leisure travelers (leisure routes) and those more likely to have both
price-insensitive business passengers and leisure consumers (big-city routes). Results
show that the merging firms increase fares for business travelers but not for leisure
passengers on big-city routes, and reduce prices for leisure travelers on leisure routes.
On the other hand, their legacy rivals increase fares on leisure routes but not on big-
city routes. This finding suggests that a critical reason for the inconsistent conclusions
in previous research may be the failure to consider the details of the airline industry,
such as market types, consumer groups, and firm types.
Chapter 2
Multimarket contact facilitates tacit collusion due to mutual forbearance (Ciliberto
and Williams, 2014), yet no existing studies have examined how multimarket contact
among firms affects their ability to price discriminate. In this paper, I provide a
ii
new theoretical model to predict how a firms price dispersion across consumer groups
changes when the firm becomes cooperative due to an increase in multimarket contact.
According to the theoretical model, if two consumer groups (e.g., business travelers
and leisure travelers) have greatly different sensitivities to purchase cheap tickets from
rival carriers (cross-price elasticity), compared to the initial price dispersion with no
changes in multimarket contact, the price dispersion could be smaller as firms overlap
more. However, if this difference in sensitivities is small, the price dispersion tends
to be larger for a firm facing greater multimarket contact. Using data from the
U.S. airline industry, my empirical analysis confirms these heterogeneous effects of
multimarket contact.
iii
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Chapter 1
When Consumer Type Matters:
Price Effects of the
United-Continental Merger in the
Airline Industry
1.1 Introduction
As a result of several recent mergers, the number of carriers in the U.S. airline
industry has fallen dramatically. These mergers have shaped it into an oligopolis-
tic industry consisting of only the big four airlines: American, Delta, United, and
Southwest; plus budget or low-cost carriers (LCCs), such as Frontier and Spirit. Al-
though these mergers have been investigated and approved by the Department of
Justice (DOJ), the effects of consolidation on competition and prices continue to at-
tract public debate. Previous studies have extensively examined whether prices have
changed following these mergers, but they have focused entirely on changes in aver-
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age airfares (Borenstein, 1990; Luo, 2014; Jain, 2015; Hu¨schelrath and Mu¨ller, 2015;
Carlton et al., 2016). Given the complexity of the airline industry in which different
types of firms (legacy carriers and LCCs) face various groups of customers (business
and leisure passengers), research evaluating average airfares alone may not sufficiently
reveal the full range of price effects.
For instance, in a market consisting of both business and leisure travelers, firms
face the tradeoff of raising prices to generate more profits from the business passengers
or reducing prices to gain more market share of the leisure travelers. Additionally,
it is possible there are two other categories of passengers: brand-loyal customers and
price-sensitive customers. When one firm decreases airfares to poach price-sensitive
customers, its rivals may lower airfares to compete or increase their airfares to focus
on brand-loyal consumers as their customer share goes up. Such industry intricacy
plays an essential role in investigating firms pricing strategies.
To address this issue, I examine how different types of firms respond to the
United-Continental (UA-CO) merger in different kinds of markets with varying com-
binations of consumer groups. Specifically, I investigate the pricing and capacity
strategies of merging firms and their rivals on routes primarily consisting of price-
sensitive leisure travelers and on routes more likely to have both price-insensitive
business passengers and leisure consumers. Following Gerardi and Shapiro (2009),
I focus on leisure routes that include cities whose economy heavily relies on accom-
modation earnings and big-city routes connecting two large cities that attract both
business and leisure travelers. In such settings, the market power effects and the
efficiency gains from a merger may be different since firms’ pricing decisions respond
to the elasticities of consumers. In addition, it is important to examine the responses
of legacy carriers and LCCs separately because of their differences in, for example,
business models and pricing strategies. Therefore, I decompose the firms into three
2
types: merging firms, legacy rivals, and LCC rivals. Moreover, unlike previous stud-
ies, I examine the evolution of prices before and after the merger rather than merely
comparing average prices during the pre- and post-periods.
My results reveal that route-level average fares do not change significantly
following the merger, but this average masks considerable variation in price responses
across firms and consumer groups. The merging firms and their legacy rivals adjust
their prices significantly in anticipation of the approval of the merger, but the LCC
rivals do not significantly change fares. More specifically, the merging firms increase
prices significantly for business travelers but not for leisure passengers on big-city
routes, and reduce fares for leisure travelers on leisure routes. On the other hand,
their legacy rivals increase fares significantly on leisure routes but not on big-city
routes. The analyses on capacity indicate that merging firms and legacy rivals have
different reasons for adjusting prices. Merging firms appear to expand capacity on
leisure routes to gain market share and reduce capacity on big-city routes to maintain
their pricing strategies. The capacity for legacy rivals on leisure routes tends to shrink
to support their high-fare policy and to reduce the percentage of very price-sensitive
leisure travelers. However, their capacity on big-city routes displays no consistent
trend.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to empirically investi-
gate how firms responding to a merger set prices for consumer groups with differing
levels of price sensitivity. For example, when the market consists of distinct customer
segments, i.e., the brand-loyal segment and price-sensitive segment, a change in com-
petition induced by a merger may lead firms to adjust the degree to which they target
different groups. Specifically, on leisure routes, the findings suggest that the merging
firms target the price-sensitive consumers by reducing prices, while their rivals re-
spond by increasing airfares to take advantage of their brand-loyal passengers. This
3
reveals a critical displacement effect. Although the effect is studied in both theoret-
ical (Perloff and Salop, 1985; Klemperer, 1987b; Rosenthal, 1980; Hollander, 1987)
and empirical (Frank and Salkever, 1997; Morrison, 2001; Tan, 2016) entry models,
it is not explored in merger research.
This paper builds on the extensive literature documenting how firms respond
to mergers in the airline industry. Existing research examines mergers occurring in the
1980s after deregulation. These studies largely find increased price effects. Borenstein
(1990) investigated two fairly similar mergers: Northwest’s merger with Republic
Airlines, and Trans World Airline’s (TWA) merger with Ozark Airlines; reporting
that the average route price change from 1985 to 1987 for the Northwest-Republic
merger was a 9.5% increase relative to industry averages compared to no increase in
price for the TWA-Ozark merger. Kim and Singal (1993) examined 14 airline mergers
from 1985 to 1988, finding that fares of both merging firms and rivals increased
by 11-12% during the merger announcement period, relative to routes involving no
merging firms for similar distances. However, during the merger completion period,
the fares for merging firms and rivals decreased by 9% and 5%, respectively. In later
research, Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010) demonstrated that the effects of the USAir
and Piedmont merger on prices from 1987 to 1989 on routes that one merged carrier
served and the other was a potential entrant were approximately half of the price
effects on routes with both merging parties present.
Of the research focused on recent legacy airline mergers, however, their findings
seem to be much more inconclusive. Some studies have found that merging firms in-
crease fares slightly on routes where both merging parties competed before the merger
(Jain, 2015; Hu¨schelrath and Mu¨ller, 2015), while a case study of the Delta-Northwest
airline merger by Luo (2014) concluded that fares did not change on nonstop routes
but increased by 2.3% on connecting routes. In addition, through combined analy-
4
sis of three legacy mergers (Delta-Northwest, United-Continental, and American-US
Airways), Carlton et al., 2016 found no significant adverse effect on route or market
fares. One critical reason for inconsistent findings in these previous studies may be the
failure to consider the complexity of the airline industry, such as different consumer
groups and market types.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
hypotheses of firms’ responses in different markets with different combinations of
consumer groups, while the background of UA-CO merger is provided in Section 3.
Section 4 discusses the data, route types, and variable construction. Sections 5 and
6 set out the model and empirical results, followed by conclusions in Section 7.
1.2 Hypotheses
A major concern of entry models has been the question of how an increase in
the number of sellers affects the pricing strategies of incumbents, as the strategies used
depend on the changes in shares of consumers with different elasticities. On the one
hand, an increase in the elasticity of the new residual demand faced by incumbents
after entry may result in their reducing prices to keep price-sensitive customers, a
situation known as the competitive effect (Perloff and Salop, 1985; Klemperer, 1987b).
On the other hand, if entry leads to a decrease in the elasticity of the residual demand
for the incumbents products, it is beneficial for them to raise prices to exploit profits.
Rosenthal (1980) and Hollander (1987) refer to this as the displacement effect. Both
the competitive effect and the displacement effect can occur in entry models because
of an increase in competition. However, a reduction in competition due to a decrease
in the number of sellers, such as through a merger, may also result in a displacement
effect.
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The following model of the responses of merging firms and their rivals illus-
trates the displacement effect. Consider two types of firms: merging firms and rival
firms, each of which produces goods different from those of its competitors. Suppose
the marginal cost of the merging firms decreases because of the efficiency gained from
the merger. Let the residual demand RD (price,quality) faced by each firm be rep-
resented by a demand curve with constant elasticity. This demand is a function of
price, including the firm’s price and the competitors’ prices, and the product quality,
including its product quality and the competitors’ product quality. There are two
groups of consumers in the merging firms’ markets: one is the business consumer who
cares about product quality as well as prices, and the other is the leisure consumer
who is sensitive to price and has a more elastic demand than the business consumer.
Both groups of consumers consist of brand-loyal customers, such as passengers en-
rolled in airline frequent-flyer programs, and non-brand-loyal customers. Suppose for
business consumers,
∂RD(price, quality)
∂own price
< 0,
∂RD(price, quality)
∂own quality
> 0,
∂RD(price, quality)
∂competitor′s price
> 0,
∂RD(price, quality)
∂competitor′s quality
< 0.
And for leisure consumers,
∂RD(price, quality)
∂own price
< 0,
6
∂RD(price, quality)
∂own quality
≈ 0,
∂RD(price, quality)
∂competitor′s price
> 0,
∂RD(price, quality)
∂competitor′s quality
≈ 0.
It is worth noting that the reduction in competition due to a merger could bring
about a decrease in the elasticity of the aggregate demand of all firms. Traditional
merger studies predict that prices will increase, and that the price for the business
consumers who are price-insensitive will increase more than the price for the leisure
consumers.1 However, this situation may not be the case for all types of firms.
(a) Merging Firms
(b) Rivals
Figure 1.1: Residual Demand for Business Products
Once firms merge, they become more attractive than their rivals in part be-
cause the merger can expand the diversity of the differentiated products; for instance,
a merger between two airlines connects both route networks. Business consumers care
about this aspect of the product quality, while leisure consumers do not. As shown in
1According to Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), a decrease in the number of competitors in a given
market will increase the high-percentile prices more than the low-percentile prices if the textbook
effect of how competition should affect price dispersion prevails.
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(a) Merging Firms (b) Rivals
Figure 1.2: Residual Demand for Leisure Products
Figure 1.1, the residual demand of business consumers of the merging firms shifts out-
ward, and its elasticity falls. Since the marginal costs of the merging firms decrease,
the net effect on price depends on which effect dominates. If business consumers per-
ceive the increase in product quality more than the decrease in marginal cost, then
merging firms will increase the price since the merger transforms business consumers
into a more price-insensitive and brand-loyal type.2 On the other hand, merging
firms’ prices for leisure consumers will decrease because of the reduction in marginal
costs and almost no increase in product quality perceived by these consumers as seen
in Figure 1.2. However, the overall reduction in competition due to the merger might
make the leisure consumer residual demand of the merging firms less elastic, and the
net effect of both the less elastic residual demand and decrease in the marginal cost
might cause either an increase in price or no change.
In such a scenario, the rivals’ responses are similar for both business con-
sumers and leisure consumers. An increase in the product quality of the merging
firms attracts some business consumers of the rivals, and a decrease in the merging
2These pricing strategies can be derived by using the Lerner Index P−MCP =
1
|| since each demand
curve is with a constant elasticity.
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firms’ price for leisure products attracts price-sensitive leisure consumers from the
rivals. This means that the rivals’ residual demands shifts inward and becomes more
inelastic. Thus, rivals tend to raise prices for both types of consumers, resulting in a
displacement effect caused when merging firms reduce the price for leisure consumers
while competitors increase their prices.
In further empirical analysis, I decompose the market into two types: leisure
markets and big-city markets. Leisure markets primarily consist of leisure consumers,
while big-city markets are composed of both leisure and price-insensitive business con-
sumers. Such markets with different combinations of consumer bases could alter a
firm’s pricing strategies. When merging firms exploit business consumers in big-city
markets by raising their prices, it becomes more difficult to reduce airfares for leisure
consumers. This is because such targeting pricing strategies encourage business con-
sumers to act like leisure consumers and buy tickets at low fares. Rivals can respond
by raising prices for both business consumers and leisure consumers. Specifically,
since there is only one type of consumer in leisure markets, the displacement effect
still holds, with merging firms targeting these consumers with lower prices and rivals
responding by increasing airfares for the remaining brand-loyal leisure consumers.
The intuition is summarized in the following hypotheses:
(a) In leisure markets, merging firms can reduce prices due to the efficiency they
gain from the merger, thus poaching non-brand-loyal customers from their rivals.
Rivals are better off increasing prices because a larger share of their remaining
customers will be brand-loyal consumers.
(b) In big-city markets, merging firms can increase prices for business consumers
when the increase in product quality perceived by those business consumers is
more than the decrease in marginal cost and vice versa. Merging firms will not
9
reduce prices for leisure consumers since group pricing strategies cannot prevent
business consumers from buying tickets as leisure consumers. In this case, rivals
may respond by raising prices only for business consumers.
1.3 Deal Background
In 2008, United Air Lines and Continental Air Lines came close to merging.
However, they negotiated a deal that made Continental a member of the United-
led Star global alliance, filling in the large and lucrative New York City market,
once a weak spot in the Star’s global network.3 Although this agreement was only for
international networks, it was a virtual merger, so defined because it included many of
the benefits of a merger. For instance, United and Continental had antitrust immunity
to operate their international networks jointly. Granted by the U.S. Transportation
Department, the immunity allowed both firms beginning in 2008 to share proprietary
market data, divvy up routes, jointly set prices and negotiate travel contracts with
corporations, and operate on the immunized portions of their networks as if they had
merged.
Because of this initial agreement, when both merging firms suggested the idea
of merging for the second time in 2010, the whole deal went very smoothly. As seen in
Table 1.1, both the Board of Directors at Continental and United Airlines approved a
stock-swap deal that made them the world’s largest airline company on May 2, 2010.
This deal, which was announced the next day, was under investigation for only about
three months before the U.S. Department of Justice approved this $3 billion merger on
one condition, transferring Continental’s slots and other assets at Newark to South-
west. Less than one month later, shareholders of both airlines approved the merger
3USATODAY: Irked US Airways ends merger talks with United.
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on September 17, 2010. Approximately two weeks later on October 1, UAL Corpora-
tion, which is the parent company of United Airlines, acquired Continental Airlines,
changing its name to United Continental Holdings, Inc., indicating the completion of
the deal. Both airlines were corporately managed by the same team, although they
remained separated until the operational integration was complete. Approximately
one year later, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a single operating
certificate to both merging firms, which allowed them to begin flying as one airline
under the name United. Then both companies started integrating their systems, a
process that was completed on March 3, 2012. The OnePass loyalty program, the
frequent flier program for Continental, was phased out on December 31, 2011.
Both merging parties were influential players in the airline industry. At the
time of the merger, United Airlines, based in Chicago, was the third largest carrier in
the United States in terms of revenue, and Continental Airlines, based in Houston, was
the fourth largest carrier in the United States. In 2009, the year before the merger,
UA earned $16.3 billion in revenue carrying approximately 80 million passengers and
offering service to 230 destinations in the United States and 30 other countries. During
the same year, CO’s income was $12.6 billion, and it carried 67 million passengers,
providing service with its regional affiliates to 265 destinations in the United States
and more than 50 other countries all over the world.
In general, there are two significant categories of carriers: legacy carriers and
low-cost carriers (LCCs); both with very different business models and pricing strate-
gies. Legacy carriers adopt the hub-and-spoke network, while LCCs use the point-to-
point operating practice. Usually, the average fares of LCCs are lower than the legacy
carriers because the former model focuses on business and operational practices to
keep airline costs low, for example by flying a single airplane type (Southwest) and
increasing airplane utilization. Table 1.2 lists these carriers around the sampling pe-
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riod for the data used in this study. The merging firms UA and CO are both legacy
carriers. In the later analysis, I further decompose carriers into three groups: merg-
ing firms, legacy rivals, and LCC rivals based on Table 1.2. Although there might
be other types of rival carriers providing flight services, such as regional legacy car-
riers like Alaska (AS) and Hawaiian Airlines (HA), these carriers only compete with
both merging firms on a few routes compared to three other national legacy rivals
American (AA), Delta (DL) and US Airways (US) (94 for AS, 2 for HA). 4
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Data Sources
The two primary data sources for this paper are the Airline Origin and Desti-
nation Survey (DB1B) published by the U.S. Department of Transportation and the
T100 Domestic Segment Database (T100). The DB1B database is a 10% quarterly
sample of all domestic tickets issued by U.S. reporting airlines, including information
on origin, destination and connecting airports, marketing carriers, operating carriers,
year, quarter, fare, and number of passengers paying that fare.5 The T100 database,
a supplement to the DB1B from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, reports ori-
4The estimation results still hold with these airlines included.
5I applied several common filters used in the airline economics literature to clean the data and
construct a comparable dataset. Only domestic direct flights are included, which encompasses both
nonstop flights and flights in which there is a stop but no change of airplane. Directionality is
suppressed; for example, a flight from Atlanta to Los Angeles is treated the same as a flight from
Los Angeles to Atlanta. A roundtrip itinerary is split into two observations, and the fare is divided
by two. Open-jaw itineraries (where a roundtrip passenger does not return to the origin city)
are dropped. Observations with fares of questionable magnitude are dropped, and bulk fares are
eliminated as well. Fares greater than five times the DOT’s Standard Industry Fare Level (SIFL)
are also excluded. I also dropped all fares that are less than $25 for a one-way trip. Only coach-class
tickets are kept. Coupon types indicating foreign carrier flying between 2 U.S. points are dropped.
To deal with the issue of code sharing, I dropped flights including a change of ticking carriers and
flights in which the operating and ticking carriers are different.
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gin, destination, carrier, aircraft type and service class for transported passengers,
number of seats, scheduled departures, departures realized by airlines and airport-
pair segments for all domestic passenger flights.6 These data are used to identify the
capacity of direct flights.
My study focuses on domestic, direct, and coach-class airline tickets from 2008:
Q3 to 2011: Q3. Since the UA-CO merger was approved by the Department of Justice
(DOJ) on August 27, 2010 (the third quarter of 2010), this quarter is identified as
t0 in the empirical analysis. However, this t0 is not a subjective cut-point as in
many previous merger studies.7 Eight quarters before t0 and four quarters after t0
are included. The excluded period is between one and two years, that is, the fifth
through eighth quarters, prior to t0. Each of the remaining nine quarters uses a
dummy to capture the dynamic change of price or capacity relative to its average
value in the excluded period. Tables 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 provide summary statistics
for the price, capacity, and market share variables used in this analysis. These data
suggest that there is no difference in the 10th percentile airfares but a difference in the
90th percentile airfares between the legacy airlines and the LCC airlines in big-city
markets. The average market shares of merging firms are more than twice of both
the legacy and the LCC rivals.
1.4.2 Route Types and Variable Construction
The two primary categories of routes involving United and Continental are
overlapping routes and control routes. The overlapping routes are defined as those be-
ing served by both merging firms, UA and CO, consistently and continuously through-
6As with the DB1B data, the directionality here is suppressed as well. By using the variable
aircraft configuration in the dataset, I kept flights of passenger configuration or flights of combined
passenger and freight on a main deck. Unlike the DB1B, this is a monthly dataset, so I totaled
seats, flights and passengers to the year-quarter-route-carrier level.
7Carlton et al. (2016); Kim and Singal (1993).
13
out the sampling period. For the control routes, neither UA nor CO offers flights on
these routes in any quarter of the sampling period. Any non-merging carrier on a
route that is in the included periods, four quarters before and after the approval
quarter as well as the approval quarter, must appear in the excluded period, the fifth
through eighth quarters prior to the approval quarter, as well.
I decompose routes, including overlapping routes and control routes, into two
sub-categories according to the location of airport endpoint(s): leisure routes and
big-city routes. I assume that tickets for routes to tourist destinations are primarily
bought by leisure travelers who are price-sensitive, while tickets for big-city routes
are bought by tourists and business travelers who are price-insensitive. Thus, firms
might adopt different pricing strategies in these two markets due to the difference in
consumer bases.
Using the methods of Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) to distinguish between leisure
routes and big-city routes, I first calculate the ratio of accommodation earnings to
total nonfarm earnings in each metropolitan area (MA) containing airports for the
years 2009 to 2011 and then take the median value from these three ratios.8 Second,
I sort the median ratios, putting them in descending order. An MA is labeled as a
leisure MA when its ratio is above the 90th percentile. Next, a leisure route is defined
as either one of its two airport endpoints located in a leisure MA. Similar to Gerardi
and Shapiro (2009), I include three areas that have no MA earnings data: San Juan,
St. Croix, and St. Thomas. Table 1.6 lists the leisure route sample.
The criterion for selecting the big-city routes is much simpler than the process
for the leisure routes. Based on the data of census 2010, a route is classified as
8These data are obtained from Bureau of Economic Analysis. Table CA5N Personal Income by
Major Component and Earnings by NAICS Industry contains information about industry earnings
in all metropolitan statistical areas throughout the United States. These three ratios for three years
cover the entire time span of my data.
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a big-city one if both its origin and destination airports are located within the 30
largest MAs in terms of population.9 The hub airports of both merging carriers UA
and CO are in these 30 largest MAs. Table 1.7 details the big-city route sample.
Based on these criteria and selection processes, the dataset for this study contains
420 overlapping routes, 112 overlapping leisure routes, 166 overlapping big-city routes,
and 7731 control routes, which include 1422 leisure routes and 69 big-city routes.
Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 show the examples of the price distributions for a
leisure route and a big-city route. These are coach-class nominal airfares during the
third quarter of 2011 on the direct flights of the leisure route from Pittsburgh (PIT) to
Las Vegas (LAS) by Delta and of the big-city route from Pittsburgh (PIT) to Houston
(IAH) by United. The distribution of a leisure route with a single mode and long
right tail indicates the majority of travelers bought tickets around $90, which appears
to be consistent with the assumption that most travelers are leisure consumers. The
histogram of the big-city overlapping route, however, displays a bimodal distribution,
which denotes a large group of travelers bought tickets for approximately $210 and
another large group for roughly $660. This characteristic of the price distribution of
a big-city overlapping route implies both leisure travelers and business travelers are
the targets of the airlines. Additionally, the big-city price distribution shows that
the 10th-20th percentile fare is close to the left mode and the 90th-80th percentile
fare is close to the right mode. Based on these distributions, in the later analysis I
will use the 10th, 15th, and 20th percentile fares to represent prices paid by leisure
passengers and the 80th, 85th, and 90th percentile fares to represent prices paid by
business travelers.10
9Data are from U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division. Miami, Fort Lauderdale, San Diego,
Tampa, and Orlando are dropped from the 30 largest MAs list because these areas are primarily
sightseeing places. Actually, Miami, Fort Lauderdale and Orlando are in the leisure MAs list.
10Most price distributions of other big-city routes show the same pattern, indicating the choices
of 10th (or 15th, 20th) percentile fare and 90th (or 85th, 80th) percentile fare could be close to the
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Before the data are collapsed into the carrier-route-year-quarter level, the
DB1B includes multiple fares for the same flight by the same carrier for a specific
quarter of the year. This data structure provides a price distribution for tickets sold
by the same carrier for a flight. From this distribution, I construct seven depen-
dent variables: average airfare, 10th percentile airfare, 15th percentile airfare, 20th
percentile airfare, 80th percentile airfare, 85th percentile airfare, and 90th percentile
airfare. The average airfare is a passenger-weighted price.11 For those percentile
fares, after sorting the fares for the same flight by a specific carrier in each quarter
and putting them in descending order, I obtain the 10th (15th, 20th) percentile airfare
and 90th (80th, 85th) percentile airfare, characterizing the discounted price (or low
price) and the full price (or high price) respectively.12 By merging T100 data with
the DB1B sample,13 I construct the capacity variable, the number of seats available
on a flight by the same carrier in a specific quarter, and the load factor, which is the
share of available seats on the flights with passengers seated in them.
1.5 Model
Different from previous merger case studies that define a subjective timing of
price changes, for instance, the approved quarter by DOJ,14 I use a baseline model
similar to that of Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) and Whinston and Collins (1992).
This model measures the change in pricing strategies for different firms before, during,
and after the merger by letting merger effects differ more finely than by pre- and
left mode and right mode (or medians), respectively.
11A fare observation associates with how many passengers bought the ticket at the same price.
12Tan (2016) holds similar specifications.
13Approximately 23 percent of observations in the DB1B matched. For the reasons for the low
matched rate, please see details in Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009).
14Prince and Simon (2017), Carlton et al. (2016), Hu¨schelrath and Mu¨ller (2015), Luo (2014),
Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010), Kim and Singal (1993).
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post-periods. The basic specification of the model is as follows, with some abuse of
notation:
ycrt =
4∑
τ=−4
βM,t0+τ [(Approval)t0+τ ∗ I(Merge)] +
4∑
τ=−4
βLY,t0+τ [(Approval)t0+τ∗
I(Legacy)] +
4∑
τ=−4
βLC,t0+τ [(Approval)t0+τ ∗ I(LCC)] + µcr + γt +Xrtθ + εcrt,
where ycrt is the dependent variable expressed by the average airfare, the 10th per-
centile airfare, the 15th percentile airfare, the 20th percentile airfare, the 80th per-
centile airfare, the 85th percentile airfare, the 90th percentile airfare, the available
seats, the flights realized, and the load factor for carrier c on route r in time t.
(Approval)t0+τ denotes the nine-quarter dummies around approved quarter t0, and
I(Merge), I(Legacy), and I(LCC) indicate merging firms, legacy rivals and LCC
rivals on overlapping routes, respectively. The coefficients for the interaction terms
of quarter dummies and firm type indicators are mutually exclusive, so the implied
effects on the dependent variable given by these coefficients are not additive. µcr
denotes the carrier-route fixed effects. The time fixed effects, γt, consist of three
parts: the quarter-of-sample fixed effects for the merging firms, the quarter-of-sample
fixed effects for the legacy rivals, and the quarter-of-sample fixed effects for the LCC
rivals. Xrt controls for route characteristics and costs including the entry and exit
of non-merging carriers, the nonstop distance, the jet fuel price, the slot-controlled
airport, and the competition from Southwest.
In the airfare regressions, I construct a constant weight for a carrier on a spe-
cific route using the average revenue of that carrier on that route in the excluded
period (that is, the fifth through eighth quarters prior to t0). For the capacity re-
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gressions, a similar method is used to construct the traffic weight for a carrier on a
route. The reason for using both weights is that from a carriers perspective, much
more attention is paid to those routes that can generate high revenue or have heavy
traffic. I also cluster the standard errors at the carrier-route level to account for het-
eroscedasticity and for correlation across observations for a particular carrier-route
combination over time.
The control group for airfare regressions of leisure routes is the leisure control
group, and the control group for airfare regressions of big-city routes is the big-city
control group. Unlike the airfare regressions, for capacity regressions of either leisure
routes or big-city routes, the control group is routes with at least two legacy carriers
and at least one LCC present. The reason for not using the same control group as
for airfare regressions is that these three types of carriers display utterly different
capacity trends in both the excluded period, the fifth through eighth quarters prior
to approval quarter, and the whole sampling period.
The nine covariates of interest for determining the responses of the merging
firms, legacy rivals, and LCC rivals in the merger event are βM,t0+τ , βLY,t0+τ , and
βLC,t0+τ . These coefficients include four quarters before approval, four quarters after
approval, and the approval quarter. It is appropriate to use such an event window
since the UA-CO merger is announced in t0 − 1, approved in t0 and completed in
t0 + 1. Firms anticipate a high chance of deal approval by DOJ based on the con-
nection between UA-CO in the virtual merger agreement in 2008. In addition, these
coefficients explain whether merging firms, legacy rivals, or LCC rivals respond to
the merger differently from their average values in the excluded period relative to the
control group.
As discussed previously, the conventional view of a merger’s price impact fo-
cuses on the average market prices or the average prices of merging firms and their
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rivals, without considering the types of markets or different consumer groups.15 This
empirical analysis assesses the firms’ pricing strategies in leisure markets with pri-
marily leisure travelers and big-city markets with both business and leisure travelers.
To test the Hypotheses (a) and (b), I treat tickets in leisure markets as primarily
bought by leisure travelers. In big-city markets, the 80th, 85th, and 90th percentile
airfares of a carrier on a route represent prices charged for business travelers, and
the 10th, 15th, and 20th percentile airfares represent prices paid by leisure travelers.
In addition to the price regressions, I also analyze the capacity strategies of firms in
both types of markets to determine if they are adjusting capacity to maintain their
pricing strategies.
1.6 Empirical Results
1.6.1 Price Regressions
Tables 1.8 through 1.13 present the results from estimating the baseline model
in different markets and with different dependent variables, with each table repre-
senting a single estimation. To compare the coefficients conveniently, I put those for
merging firms, legacy rivals, and LCC rivals into three columns. To visualize the
firms’ responses to the merger, I also created price paths based on the coefficients
for the interaction terms of quarter dummies and firm type indicators (Figures 1.5
through 1.9).
Table 1.8 is a partial replication of Carlton et al. (2016) with a 9-quarter event
window and the fifth through eighth quarters prior to t0 as an excluded period. The
results show the average market fare only trending up and down. It seems that there
15Borenstein (1990), Kim and Singal (1993), and Carlton et al. (2016) only consider the overlapping
routes where both merging parties are present.
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is a rise at t0, but the coefficient is not significantly different from the coefficients
for t0-1, t0-2, t0-3, and t0-4 at the 5% level. This result is consistent with Carlton
et al. (2016), who conclude that the UA-CO merger has no significant price effect
on overlapping routes. However, after the market-level price is decomposed into the
firm-level price, the results seen in Table 1.9 indicate an entirely different scenario.
Both merging firms and legacy rivals significantly increase fares in anticipation of the
merger’s approval,16 with the fares remaining at these high levels. However, the LCC
rivals do not change their fares significantly. These results imply that the analysis
conducted by Carlton et al. (2016) may be incomplete. By the time the merger is
approved by DOJ, the fares of merging firms on overlapping routes are 14.8% 17 above
the excluded period relative to the control routes, and the legacy rivals are 12.1%
higher. On average, the percentage change in price is above 8% for both merging
firms and legacy rivals. Although the legacy rivals might not display a significant
increasing pattern here, a clear pattern is found in the leisure markets.
The results of leisure routes are consistent with Hypothesis (a) (see Table 1.10).
Merging firms begin reducing fares after the approval, even though the coefficients of
t0+2 and t0+3 are not significant. It is noted that t0+1 represents the quarter the deal
is completed, suggesting that merging firms see efficiency gains after the completion
period when both UA and CO are corporately controlled by the same leadership.
Kim and Singal (1993) find similar results in their studies of 14 mergers from the
1980s. Conversely, the legacy rivals respond by beginning to increase fares in the deal
16Borenstein (1990), Kim and Singal (1993), and Prager and Hannan (1998) found the timing of
price increases is before the merging firms allowed to coordinate their operation legally. Weinberg
(2007) explains this phenomenon using the standard models of switching costs, in which firms initially
price low to gain market share and later extract consumer surplus by increasing prices. This switching
cost plays a role in locking consumers initially. When two firms merge, there is uncertainty concerning
the future of management teams in the newly merged firm, so the incentive to invest in the market
share is lost because managers may lose their jobs as a result of restructuring and not realize a
return from this investment.
17exp(0.138)-1
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announcement period t0-1, and, on average, the fares are approximately 10% higher
than in the excluded period relative to the control group. The LCC rivals show no
significant evidence of rising or declining fares. These patterns seem to imply that
product substitution between two legacy carriers is greater than that between a legacy
carrier and a low-cost carrier. This suggests that perhaps the low-price strategy of
merging firms primarily focuses on poaching price-sensitive passengers from legacy
rivals in leisure markets. By raising fares, the legacy rivals seem to respond by
exploiting their brand-preferred leisure travelers, such as those consumers enrolled
in frequent-flyer programs, to maximize profits. Empirical results from the leisure
markets support the existence of the displacement effect even when the number of
firms decreases.
The two major groups of travelers in big-city markets, business travelers and
leisure travelers, are pooled in Table 1.11, which presents results from estimating the
average logged fares. Results indicate that merging firms begin raising fares one quar-
ter before the announcement period t0-1, legacy rivals’ responses are negligible since
most coefficients are indifferent from zero at the 5% level, and the coefficients in the
LCC rivals column are constant at approximately -44%. To look closely at the firms’
pricing strategies for both leisure and business travelers on big-city routes, the 10th,
15th, and 20th percentile airfares are used to represent the prices charged for low-fare
leisure travelers, and the 80th, 85th, and 90th percentile airfares represent the prices
paid by high-fare business travelers, as suggested in the previous data section. The
regression results for leisure travelers using 10th, 15th, and 20th percentile airfares
are very similar, and regression results for business passengers using 80th, 85th, and
90th percentile airfares are identical as well. Thus, only the results of 15th and 85th
percentile airfares are presented in Tables 1.12 and 1.13, respectively.
As seen in Tables 1.12, merging firms increase their fares for leisure travelers in
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big-city markets only in the announcement quarter and the approval quarter, then the
effects return to zero quickly, which implies that merging firms do not apply a stable
pricing rule to target leisure travelers. Similarly, neither legacy rivals nor LCC rivals
have significant pricing patterns. Coefficients for legacy rivals trend up and down.
However, in Table 1.13, merging firms begin increasing fares for business travelers
in quarter t0-2, with their coefficients remaining steady in the higher percentages.
Although legacy rivals seem to reduce prices for business travelers a little around
10%, most of the coefficients are neither significant nor significantly different from
zero. The coefficients for LCC rivals move up and down around -0.55, indicating no
significant pricing pattern. The empirical results for merging firms in big-city mar-
kets are consistent with Hypothesis (b), that is, merging firms raise fares for business
travelers without adjusting fares for leisure travelers and both types of rivals show no
significant changes in airfares for business travelers and leisure travelers. One reason
for their lack of significant response could be that there are no network advanta-
geous gains for them through the merger, and their network might even become less
favourable compared to merging firms.
In conclusion, due to the efficiency gains from the merger, merging firms adopt
a low-price strategy in leisure markets to attract price-sensitive passengers, and legacy
rivals respond by raising fares. In big-city markets, merging firms increase prices only
for the business travelers but do not reduce airfares for the leisure passengers. This
strategy avoids business travelers pretending to be leisure travelers and buying tickets
at lower prices. However, both types of rivals exhibit no significant responses in their
pricing strategies.
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1.6.2 Capacity Regressions
Tables 1.14 through 1.19 show the results of capacity regressions using the
T100 data. These regressions test whether firms adopt specific capacity strategies
to maintain or support their pricing strategies in response to the merger. The re-
gressions use three dependent variables of available seats, flights realized, and load
factor for both types of overlapping markets, leisure markets and big-city markets.
This T100 dataset, as a supplement to the analysis of the firms’ pricing strategies, is
composed of the number of passengers, flights, and available seats by segment-carrier-
month, which are initially aggregated by route-carrier-quarter and then matched with
the DB1B observations. It is important to note that some of the coefficients are not
conventionally significant, specifically for the results of available seats and flights real-
ized.18 This lack of statistical significance is probably a consequence of the weaknesses
in the low match rate between the DB1B data and the T100 data.
Both Table 1.14 and Table 1.15 show similar patterns for merging firms and
legacy rivals. Throughout the entire nine quarters around the approval period, it
is probable that merging firms expand capacities regarding both available seats and
flights for leisure routes, given the point estimates and the precision of the coefficients.
On the other hand, legacy rivals begin reducing capacity from the announcement
quarter t0-1. However, unlike for merging firms or legacy rivals, there is no evidence
to support a clear and steady capacity strategy for LCC rivals. Table 1.16 presents
the dynamic changes in the load factor (defined as the share of available seats on
the flights with passengers in them). Although merging firms expand capacity, the
load factor increases significantly. This trend implies that the increase in passengers
attracted to merging firms due to a low-fare strategy is more than the increase in
18The capacity estimations with respect to available seats and flights in Goolsbee and Syverson
(2008) have a similar issue about the coefficients.
23
capacity. For the legacy rivals, the load factor appears to begin to fall after cutting
capacity, perhaps indicating a decrease in passengers due to an increase in fares
for leisure travelers more than the decrease in capacity. As has been demonstrated
previously in the price regressions section, merging firms decrease fares while legacy
rivals increase prices in leisure markets. The results for capacity show that firms
adopt capacity strategies to maintain their pricing strategies on leisure routes.
The results for capacity change in big-city markets are shown in Tables 1.17
through 1.19. Unlike in the leisure markets, merging firms adopt a different capacity
strategy here. Their capacity on big-city routes tends to shrink, which is consistent
with their pricing strategy of increasing fares for business travelers without adjusting
fares for leisure passengers. Capacities for both legacy rivals and LCC rivals provide
no clues concerning capacity changes, only showing an up and down trend since they
have no steady and significant pricing responses on big-city routes. As seen in Table
1.19, the load factors for all three types of firms do not show a clear trend. This
situation is probably caused by a lack of distinction in the data between the capacity
for business travelers and leisure travelers in big-city markets.
1.6.3 Testing Potential Causes for Price Changes in Leisure
Markets
In a traditional merger analysis, the prices usually go up due to the reduction
in competition. However, the results of the estimations for leisure markets show
that merging firms appear to poach customers from legacy rivals by reducing fares
and expanding capacity, with legacy rivals responding by significantly increasing fares.
Different responses among merging firms, legacy rivals, and LCC rivals seem to reflect
the various potential causes of price changes.
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Airline companies are differentiated along many dimensions, including brand,
airport share, ticket price, service quality, network, and frequent-flyer program, among
others. In such a differentiated product market, prices can go up or down, depending
on consumer preferences and substitution patterns. Here the preferences are char-
acterized by heterogeneous consumer segments: brand-loyal passengers enrolled in
frequent-flyer programs and passengers concerned only with prices. Under price com-
petition, every firm’s optimal price increases in the share of its brand-loyal consumers
and its competitor’s share of brand-loyal consumers, and decreases in the share of
non-brand-loyal consumers (Klemperer, 1987a; Hastings, 2004).
It is possible that the share of brand-loyal customers is higher in a legacy-
dominated market than in an LCC-dominated market due to the intense price com-
petition from LCCs. By using the market share of LCC rivals as a criterion to de-
compose the leisure routes into two categories; routes with the market share of LCC
rivals higher than 50% and those under 50%,19 I am able to distinguish brand-loyal
consumers from non-brand-loyal consumers. Table 1.20 shows the summary statistics
for both categories of leisure routes. The average airfares of merging firms, legacy
rivals, and LCC rivals on LCC-dominated routes and the average airfare of LCC ri-
vals on legacy-dominated routes are very close, even with their standard deviations
being at the same level. However, average fares of both merging firms and legacy
rivals on legacy-dominated routes are much higher than those four similar average
airfares. These statistics indicate there may be one type of price-sensitive consumer
in a market with a high share of LCCs, and two types of consumers in a market with
a low percentage of LCCs, specifically brand-loyal passengers and price-sensitive pas-
sengers. According to the above theory, when two legacy carriers merge, equilibrium
19This threshold is not critical as the summary statistics (Table 1.20) and later price regressions
(Tables 1.21 and 1.22) are not sensitive to it. I also tried routes with LCC rivals market share
greater than 60% (70%) or less than 40% (30%) and did not find significantly different results.
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prices will increase more in a market with a low share of LCCs than in a market with
a high share of LCCs, under the assumption that most consumers of an LCC are
price-sensitive passengers.
Tables 1.21 and 1.22 present results for these two categories of leisure routes
based on an estimation of the baseline model using the logged average fares. Com-
paring these two tables indicates that both legacy rivals and LCC rivals raise prices
significantly in legacy-dominated markets, but not in LCC-dominated markets. Ad-
ditionally, the results for merging firms on legacy-dominated routes are similar to the
results in Table 1.10 that pool the markets together with both high and low share
of LCCs, that is, merging firms begin reducing fares in t0+1 to attract the price-
sensitive passengers. In light of the merging firms’ potential incentive to expand their
market, legacy rivals raise fares to approximately 11% higher than in the excluded
period relative to the control group. In contrast to their insignificant coefficients seen
in Table 1.10, LCC rivals increase their fares significantly for approximately three
quarters. Here, the substantial effect of reduction in competition due to the merger
in legacy-dominated markets and loyal passengers enrolled in frequent flyer programs
of LCCs could contribute to the significant response of the LCC rivals. In contrast,
on the LCC-dominated routes, none of the coefficients of these three types of carriers
is different from zero at a 5% level. Merging firms seem to raise fares, and both legacy
rivals and LCC rivals show no clear responses.
The patterns of merging firms lend some evidence to support that they tend
to poach non-brand-loyal customers of both legacy rivals and LCC rivals in markets
with high shares of legacy carriers. This pricing strategy of merging firms could be
an attempt to target the customers of legacy rivals since no clear and significant
pattern is displayed in LCC-dominated markets. Another reason is that the prod-
uct differentiation in legacy-dominated markets is smaller for merging firms than in
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LCC-dominated markets. In this case, rivals raise fares to exploit the brand-loyal
consumers in markets with less product differentiation from the merging firms. Such
a displacement effect is consistent with a model of differentiated products with con-
sumer brand loyalty.
1.7 Conclusions
This paper studies the pricing responses of firms to the 2010 United-Continental
merger by examining how three types of carriers—merging firms, legacy rivals, and
LCC rivals—respond during nine quarters around the approval by the DOJ. Consis-
tent with Carlton et al. (2016), the results for route-level average airfares of over-
lapping routes with both merging parties present indicate that the merger has no
significant adverse effect. However, differences in the networks and operating models
of a legacy carrier and a LCC means that their responses to the merger vary when
the route-level airfares are decomposed into carrier-level airfares.
The results of price effects, as predicted by the hypotheses, indicate that merg-
ing firms and rivals respond differently to the merger in the two types of markets
with varying combinations of consumer groups. On leisure routes primarily con-
sisting of price-sensitive travelers, merging firms reduce fares in the deal completion
quarter to poach the non-brand-loyal customers of their rivals, while rivals respond
by raising fares in legacy-dominated leisure markets. On the other hand, on big-city
routes with heterogeneous consumer groups, price-insensitive business passengers, and
leisure travelers, merging parties increase the airfares for business travelers without
decreasing the prices for leisure travelers. On the same type of route, rivals adopt no
obvious and significant pricing strategies.
Beyond these significant pricing effects, there is also evidence suggesting why
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firms maintain such pricing strategies. Specifically, merging firms appear to expand
capacity on leisure routes and reduce their capacity on big-city routes to maintain
their respective pricing strategies. The capacity for legacy rivals in leisure markets
tends to shrink to support their high-fare strategy, while their capacity in big-city
markets displays no steady trend. The analysis of the load factor reveals more about
the incentives behind the firms’ pricing strategies. The significant increasing trend
of the load factor on leisure routes implies that merging parties gain market shares
based on the low-fare rule. However, the load factor for legacy rivals seems to begin to
fall after they reduce their capacity in leisure markets. This could mean that legacy
rivals abandon a fraction of price-sensitive non-brand-loyal leisure travelers and earn
more revenue with lower costs by exploiting their remaining brand-loyal customers.
In big-city markets, there is no clear and distinct trend for firms regarding the load
factor, likely, because of the lack of distinction between the capacity for business and
leisure passengers. Perhaps, merging firms want to improve their financial situations
by generating a stable cash-flow from business travelers on big-city routes to address
their losses from the recession in 2008 and 2009.
This paper’s findings suggest that the displacement effect can be present in
a situation involving a reduction in competition. In leisure markets when merging
firms reduce airfares, legacy rivals increase prices. Such responses are consistent
with a model of differentiated products with consumer brand loyalty. In addition,
Kim and Singal (1993) hypothesize that for all types of overlapping markets, the
market-power effect dominates during the announcement period, whereas the joint
and offsetting effects of market power and efficiency gains come into play during
the merger deal completion period. In contrast, the results in this paper show that
merging firms can take advantage of both effects simultaneously in different markets
by targeting a particular consumer group with different pricing strategies. Future
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research on mergers in other oligopolistic industries may help to reveal how often
mergers generate significant displacement effects.
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Figure 1.3: Histogram Example of Price Distribution for a Leisure Route
Note: These are the coach-class nominal fares during the third quarter of 2011 from Pittsburgh (PIT) to Las Vegas
(LAS) on the direct flights of Delta Airlines.
Figure 1.4: Histogram Example of Price Distribution for a Big-City Route
Note: These are the coach-class nominal fares during the third quarter of 2011 from Pittsburgh (PIT) to Houston
(IAH) on the direct flights of United Airlines.
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Figure 1.5: Firms’ Responses to the Merger on Overlapping Routes (Average Airfare)
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Figure 1.6: Firms’ Responses to the Merger on Leisure Routes (Average Airfare)
Figure 1.7: Firms’ Responses to the Merger on Big-City Routes (Average Airfare)
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Figure 1.8: Firms’ Responses to the Merger on Big-City Routes (15th Percentile
Airfare)
Figure 1.9: Firms’ Responses to the Merger on Big-City Routes (85th Percentile
Airfare)
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Table 1.1: Stages of the Merger Deal
Early 2008 “Virtual Merger”
May 3, 2010 Announcement
Aug. 27, 2010 Approval of DOJ
Oct. 1, 2010 Deal Completed
Nov. 30, 2011 Operating Certificate of FAA
March 3, 2012 System Integration & CO OnePass Phased Out
Table 1.2: Carriers and their Categories
Type Code Carrier
Legacy(5)
AA American Airlines
CO Continental Air Lines (M)
DL Delta Air Lines
UA United Air Lines (M)
US US Airways
LCC(9)
B6 JetBlue Airways
F9 Frontier Airlines
FL AirTran Airways
G4 Allegiant Air
NK Spirit Air Lines
SY Sun Country Airlines
TZ ATA Airlines
VX Virgin America
WN Southwest Airlines
Note: Carriers with M in the parentheses are marked as merging
firms.
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics (Route-Level)
Variable Route TypeOverlap Leisure Big-City Control
Average Airfare 222.804 231.992 226.313 232.020
(75.667) (99.343) (70.052) (132.467)
Available Seats 65437.63 57744.43 84121.16 83670.25
(82829.22) (68290.07) (95043.71) (102581.1)
Load Factor 0.8144 0.84037 0.8008 0.7922
(0.1736) (0.1403) (0.174) (0.1302)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table 1.4: Summary Statistics (Leisure Routes)
Variable Leisure RoutesMerging Firms Legacy Rivals LCC Rivals
Average Airfare 239.261 247.121 183.186
(95.275) (103.134) (47.261)
Available Seats 70881.6 61769.81 43627.92
(79812) (79105.3) (28991.8)
Load Factor 0.8513 0.8356 0.8404
(0.121) (0.146) (0.141)
Market Share 0.251 0.172 0.171
(0.262) (0.225) (0.259)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics (Big-City Routes)
Variable Big-City RoutesMerging Firms Legacy Rivals LCC Rivals
Average Airfare 235.120 234.622 191.87
(55.742) (67.057) (49.568)
10th Percentile Airfare 137.547 144.426 133.805
(29.960) (54.616) (44.413)
90th Percentile Airfare 425.996 384.427 291.190
(155.949) (145.71) (83.64)
Available Seats 98543.66 86701.99 51830.77
(95355.48) (104492.7) (39254.61)
Load Factor 0.827 0.790 0.788
(0.120) (0.188) (0.205)
Market Share 0.351 0.156 0.123
(0.327) (0.234) (0.178)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 1.6: Leisure Routes Sample
MA Airport Accommodation/Nonfarm Earnings (median)
Atlantic City-Hammonton, NJ ACY 0.2042612
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV LAS 0.1566679
Kahului-Wailuku-Lahaina, HI OGG 0.1479694
Reno, NV RNO 0.0460088
Myrtle Beach-Conway-North Myrtle Beach, SC-NC MYR 0.0456113
Flagstaff, AZ FLG 0.0386447
Gulfport-Biloxi-Pascagoula, MS GPT 0.0386114
Brunswick, GA BQK 0.0365357
Lake Charles, LA LCH 0.0297182
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL MCO 0.0295822
Napa, CA APC 0.0279597
Salinas, CA MRY 0.0251734
Urban Honolulu, HI HNL 0.0238568
Santa Fe, NM SAF 0.0233381
Hilton Head Island-Bluffton-Beaufort, SC SAV 0.0216004
St. George, UT SGU 0.0187629
Memphis, TN-MS-AR MEM 0.0166779
Bend-Redmond, OR RDM 0.0166375
Panama City, FL PFN 0.0153526
San Luis Obispo-Paso Robles-Arroyo Grande, CA SBP 0.0152183
New Orleans-Metairie, LA MSY 0.0137413
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL MIA FLL PBI 0.013192
Wenatchee, WA EAT 0.0128621
Rapid City, SD RAP 0.0127379
Asheville, NC AVL 0.0127143
Santa Maria-Santa Barbara, CA SBA 0.0126143(90th percentile)
San Juan, PR SJU N/A
St. Croix, VI STX N/A
St. Thomas, VI STT N/A
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Table 1.7: Big-City Routes Sample
MA Airport census2010
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA JFK, EWR, LGA 19567410
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA LAX, SNA, BUR 12828837
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI ORD, MDW 9461105
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX DAL, DFW 6426214
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD PHL 5965343
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX IAH 5920416
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV DCA, IAD 5636232
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA ATL 5286728
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH BOS 4552402
San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA SFO, OAK 4335391
Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI DTW 4296250
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA ONT 4224851
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ PHX 4192887
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA SEA 3439809
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI MSP 3348859
St. Louis, MO-IL STL 2787701
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD BWI 2710489
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO DEN 2543482
Pittsburgh, PA PIT 2356285
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA PDX 2226009
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC CLT 2217012
Sacramento–Roseville–Arden-Arcade, CA SMF 2149127
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX SAT 2142508
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN CVG 2114580
Cleveland-Elyria, OH CLE 2077240
Kansas City, MO-KS MCI 2009342(30th)
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Table 1.8: Price Effects on
Overlapping Routes
(Route-Level Average Airfare)
ln(fare) Overlapping Routes
t0 − 4 -0.0760***
(0.0213)
t0 − 3 -0.0857***
(0.0185)
t0 − 2 -0.0878***
(0.0191)
t0 − 1 -0.0606**
(0.0195)
t0 -0.0461*
(0.0211)
t0 + 1 -0.0751***
(0.0201)
t0 + 2 -0.0751***
(0.0210)
t0 + 3 -0.126***
(0.0202)
t0 + 4 -0.0956***
(0.0222)
N 37900
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier
fixed effects, quarter-of-sample fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗p < 0.05,
∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Table 1.9: Firms’ Responses to the Merger
on Overlapping Routes (Average Airfare)
ln(fare)
Overlapping Routes
Merge Legacy LCC
t0 − 4 0.00604 0.0585*** -0.188***
(0.0107) (0.0141) (0.0478)
t0 − 3 0.00841 0.0241 -0.143**
(0.0133) (0.0144) (0.0450)
t0 − 2 0.0543** 0.0245 -0.150**
(0.0171) (0.0194) (0.0464)
t0 − 1 0.105*** 0.0817** -0.125**
(0.0200) (0.0256) (0.0481)
t0 0.138*** 0.114*** -0.118*
(0.0201) (0.0240) (0.0501)
t0 + 1 0.0654** 0.0812** -0.142**
(0.0212) (0.0267) (0.0483)
t0 + 2 0.109*** 0.0829** -0.182***
(0.0294) (0.0312) (0.0476)
t0 + 3 0.0768* 0.0613* -0.201***
(0.0340) (0.0240) (0.0458)
t0 + 4 0.0885* 0.0765** -0.173***
(0.0362) (0.0254) (0.0490)
N 68314 68314 68314
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier fixed effects, merging
firms quarter-of-sample fixed effects, legacy rivals quarter-of-
sample fixed effects, and LCC rivals quarter-of-sample fixed
effects. Standard errors in parentheses, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01,
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Table 1.10: Firms’ Responses to the
Merger on Leisure Routes (Average
Airfare)
ln(fare)
Leisure Routes
Merge Legacy LCC
t0 − 4 -0.0462* 0.0470* -0.0229
(0.0190) (0.0216) (0.0969)
t0 − 3 -0.0462* 0.0316 -0.00972
(0.0181) (0.0210) (0.0930)
t0 − 2 -0.0396 0.0332 0.0114
(0.0209) (0.0289) (0.0942)
t0 − 1 -0.0181 0.134*** 0.0682
(0.0297) (0.0296) (0.0987)
t0 -0.0149 0.112*** 0.0798
(0.0319) (0.0326) (0.105)
t0 + 1 -0.0620* 0.0957* 0.0576
(0.0279) (0.0408) (0.101)
t0 + 2 -0.0799 0.104* 0.0102
(0.0410) (0.0480) (0.0996)
t0 + 3 -0.0779 0.128*** -0.00809
(0.0446) (0.0303) (0.0876)
t0 + 4 -0.109* 0.116*** 0.0440
(0.0429) (0.0300) (0.0984)
N 17489 17489 17489
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier fixed effects,
merging firms quarter-of-sample fixed effects, legacy rivals
quarter-of-sample fixed effects, and LCC rivals quarter-of-
sample fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses,
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Table 1.11: Firms’ Responses to the Merger
on Big-City Routes (Average Airfare)
ln(fare)
Big-City Routes
Merge Legacy LCC
t0 − 4 0.0157 0.0127 -0.489***
(0.0135) (0.0514) (0.0957)
t0 − 3 0.0116 -0.115 -0.417***
(0.0174) (0.0618) (0.0874)
t0 − 2 0.0664** -0.206*** -0.440***
(0.0219) (0.0455) (0.0919)
t0 − 1 0.126*** -0.228 -0.440***
(0.0241) (0.144) (0.0938)
t0 0.175*** -0.0648 -0.421***
(0.0230) (0.0695) (0.0969)
t0 + 1 0.0815** -0.0273 -0.442***
(0.0266) (0.0410) (0.0930)
t0 + 2 0.137*** -0.0816 -0.475***
(0.0361) (0.0619) (0.0913)
t0 + 3 0.0870* -0.176 -0.494***
(0.0435) (0.0995) (0.0915)
t0 + 4 0.115* -0.102 -0.487***
(0.0463) (0.0554) (0.0945)
N 12831 12831 12831
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier fixed effects, merging
firms quarter-of-sample fixed effects, legacy rivals quarter-of-
sample fixed effects, and LCC rivals quarter-of-sample fixed
effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p <
0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Table 1.12: Firms’ Responses to the Merger
on Big-City Routes (15th Percentile
Airfare)
ln(p15)
Big-City Routes
Merge Legacy LCC
t0 − 4 0.000970 -0.0616 -0.425***
(0.0141) (0.0404) (0.0887)
t0 − 3 0.00658 -0.234*** -0.342***
(0.0183) (0.0538) (0.0693)
t0 − 2 -0.0298 0.0177 -0.348***
(0.0226) (0.283) (0.0750)
t0 − 1 0.0632** -0.285 -0.352***
(0.0227) (0.178) (0.0761)
t0 0.133*** -0.123* -0.323***
(0.0241) (0.0615) (0.0784)
t0 + 1 0.0246 -0.0625 -0.371***
(0.0265) (0.0534) (0.0744)
t0 + 2 -0.00366 -0.149 -0.409***
(0.0358) (0.0830) (0.0730)
t0 + 3 -0.00810 -0.253* -0.481***
(0.0425) (0.114) (0.0846)
t0 + 4 -0.0133 -0.139** -0.380***
(0.0447) (0.0519) (0.0780)
N 12831 12831 12831
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier fixed effects, merg-
ing firms quarter-of-sample fixed effects, legacy rivals quarter-
of-sample fixed effects, and LCC rivals quarter-of-sample fixed
effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, ∗p < 0.05,
∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Table 1.13: Firms’ Responses to the Merger
on Big-City Routes (85th Percentile
Airfare)
ln(p85)
Big-City Routes
Merge Legacy LCC
t0 − 4 0.00165 0.0829 -0.620***
(0.00759) (0.0934) (0.124)
t0 − 3 -0.00829 -0.100 -0.528***
(0.0131) (0.0824) (0.112)
t0 − 2 0.0697*** -0.139** -0.532***
(0.0182) (0.0492) (0.115)
t0 − 1 0.109*** -0.121 -0.541***
(0.0188) (0.119) (0.120)
t0 0.135*** -0.103 -0.545***
(0.0198) (0.123) (0.121)
t0 + 1 0.0901*** -0.0631 -0.551***
(0.0224) (0.112) (0.116)
t0 + 2 0.149*** -0.0537 -0.579***
(0.0264) (0.0864) (0.121)
t0 + 3 0.0802** -0.159 -0.603***
(0.0286) (0.0971) (0.120)
t0 + 4 0.100** -0.130 -0.632***
(0.0319) (0.109) (0.120)
N 12831 12831 12831
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier fixed effects, merg-
ing firms quarter-of-sample fixed effects, legacy rivals quarter-
of-sample fixed effects, and LCC rivals quarter-of-sample fixed
effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, ∗p < 0.05,
∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Table 1.14: Firms’ Responses in
Capacity on Leisure Routes (Seats)
ln(seats)
Leisure Routes
Merge Legacy LCC
t0 − 4 0.125 -0.0612 0.0694
(0.244) (0.0820) (0.0620)
t0 − 3 0.278 -0.0808 0.0201
(0.357) (0.0951) (0.0649)
t0 − 2 0.404 -0.222* -0.0480
(0.414) (0.105) (0.0854)
t0 − 1 0.492 -0.0354 0.193*
(0.477) (0.125) (0.0843)
t0 0.328 -0.114 0.167
(0.450) (0.147) (0.0855)
t0 + 1 0.497 -0.140 0.0959
(0.591) (0.136) (0.0740)
t0 + 2 0.869 -0.235 0.0266
(0.843) (0.157) (0.0971)
t0 + 3 1.032 -0.259 0.210*
(1.016) (0.149) (0.0825)
t0 + 4 0.863 -0.198 0.181
(0.960) (0.150) (0.0960)
N 2143 2143 2143
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier fixed effects,
merging firms quarter-of-sample fixed effects, legacy rivals
quarter-of-sample fixed effects, and LCC rivals quarter-of-
sample fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses,
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Table 1.15: Firms’ Responses in Capacity
on Leisure Routes (Flights)
ln(flights)
Leisure Routes
Merge Legacy LCC
t0 − 4 0.137 -0.121 0.0804
(0.227) (0.0832) (0.0585)
t0 − 3 0.271 -0.0926 0.0684
(0.328) (0.0908) (0.0675)
t0 − 2 0.379 -0.225* 0.0317
(0.380) (0.103) (0.0947)
t0 − 1 0.462 -0.0860 0.218*
(0.438) (0.128) (0.0881)
t0 0.319 -0.192 0.188*
(0.415) (0.150) (0.0850)
t0 + 1 0.461 -0.156 0.101
(0.544) (0.134) (0.0741)
t0 + 2 0.816 -0.239 0.0327
(0.774) (0.153) (0.0948)
t0 + 3 0.990 -0.254 0.220**
(0.933) (0.153) (0.0823)
t0 + 4 0.843 -0.212 0.201*
(0.881) (0.148) (0.0959)
N 2143 2143 2143
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier fixed effects,
merging firms quarter-of-sample fixed effects, legacy rivals
quarter-of-sample fixed effects, and LCC rivals quarter-of-
sample fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses,
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Table 1.16: Firms’ Responses in Capacity on
Leisure Routes (Load Factor)
ln(load factor)
Leisure Routes
Merge Legacy LCC
t0 − 4 0.124*** 0.00465 -0.0141
(0.0368) (0.0185) (0.0220)
t0 − 3 0.202*** 0.0229 0.0441*
(0.0555) (0.0136) (0.0215)
t0 − 2 0.241*** -0.00715 0.0601**
(0.0658) (0.0320) (0.0188)
t0 − 1 0.292*** -0.0284* -0.0172
(0.0740) (0.0135) (0.0197)
t0 0.250*** -0.0571 -0.0275
(0.0726) (0.0324) (0.0264)
t0 + 1 0.357*** -0.0215 -0.0161
(0.0932) (0.0242) (0.0223)
t0 + 2 0.520*** 0.0191 0.0332
(0.132) (0.0189) (0.0277)
t0 + 3 0.662*** 0.00391 -0.00648
(0.157) (0.0177) (0.0246)
t0 + 4 0.617*** -0.0197 0.00708
(0.148) (0.0169) (0.0310)
N 2136 2136 2136
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier fixed effects, merging firms
quarter-of-sample fixed effects, legacy rivals quarter-of-sample fixed
effects, and LCC rivals quarter-of-sample fixed effects. Standard er-
rors are in parentheses, ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Table 1.17: Firms’ Responses in Capacity
on Big-City Routes (Seats)
ln(seats)
Big-City Routes
Merge Legacy LCC
t0 − 4 -0.0371 0.121*** 0.137*
(0.0749) (0.0346) (0.0678)
t0 − 3 -0.190 -0.0442 -0.123
(0.117) (0.0832) (0.0795)
t0 − 2 -0.355* -0.191** -0.256**
(0.142) (0.0588) (0.0848)
t0 − 1 -0.288 0.0304 0.0599
(0.161) (0.106) (0.100)
t0 -0.201 0.113 0.0322
(0.149) (0.0962) (0.145)
t0 + 1 -0.294 -0.00209 -0.157
(0.194) (0.0897) (0.160)
t0 + 2 -0.534 -0.131 -0.327*
(0.278) (0.104) (0.152)
t0 + 3 -0.452 -0.0604 -0.0670
(0.331) (0.0789) (0.200)
t0 + 4 -0.416 0.0283 0.145
(0.315) (0.0758) (0.128)
N 3659 3659 3659
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier fixed effects,
merging firms quarter-of-sample fixed effects, legacy rivals
quarter-of-sample fixed effects, and LCC rivals quarter-of-
sample fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses,
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Table 1.18: Firms’ Responses in Capacity on
Big-City Routes (Flights)
ln(flights)
Big-City Routes
Merge Legacy LCC
t0 − 4 -0.0596 0.0389 0.125
(0.0690) (0.0365) (0.0666)
t0 − 3 -0.223* -0.0778 -0.0874
(0.108) (0.0793) (0.0813)
t0 − 2 -0.375** -0.199*** -0.200*
(0.133) (0.0560) (0.0959)
t0 − 1 -0.324* -0.0284 0.0614
(0.150) (0.109) (0.102)
t0 -0.242 0.0205 0.0252
(0.138) (0.0988) (0.142)
t0 + 1 -0.340 -0.0296 -0.162
(0.179) (0.0873) (0.161)
t0 + 2 -0.588* -0.156 -0.325*
(0.256) (0.0978) (0.151)
t0 + 3 -0.518 -0.0814 -0.0810
(0.305) (0.0828) (0.205)
t0 + 4 -0.474 -0.0348 0.130
(0.291) (0.0800) (0.123)
N 3659 3659 3659
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier fixed effects, merging
firms quarter-of-sample fixed effects, legacy rivals quarter-of-
sample fixed effects, and LCC rivals quarter-of-sample fixed
effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p <
0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Table 1.19: Firms’ Responses in Capacity on
Big-City Routes (Load Factor)
ln(load factor)
Big-City Routes
Merge Legacy LCC
t0 − 4 -0.00154 0.0391* 0.0213
(0.0108) (0.0182) (0.0226)
t0 − 3 -0.0692*** 0.0323** 0.0326
(0.0157) (0.0112) (0.0205)
t0 − 2 -0.118*** -0.00845 -0.0155
(0.0187) (0.0122) (0.0191)
t0 − 1 -0.0377 -0.000683 -0.00476
(0.0211) (0.0125) (0.0201)
t0 -0.0363 0.0220 0.0236
(0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0277)
t0 + 1 -0.104*** -0.00104 -0.0400
(0.0258) (0.0213) (0.0231)
t0 + 2 -0.192*** -0.0113 -0.0122
(0.0391) (0.0162) (0.0293)
t0 + 3 -0.116** 0.0238 0.000921
(0.0439) (0.0158) (0.0242)
t0 + 4 -0.0972* 0.0372* 0.0677*
(0.0418) (0.0146) (0.0327)
N 3644 3644 3644
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier fixed effects, merging firms
quarter-of-sample fixed effects, legacy rivals quarter-of-sample fixed ef-
fects, and LCC rivals quarter-of-sample fixed effects. Standard errors are
in parentheses, ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Table 1.20: Summary Statistics of Leisure Markets with Different
Market Shares of LCC Rivals
Variable
Leisure Routes
Merge Legacy LCC
Market Share (LCC<0.5) 0.2978 0.5758 0.1077
(0.2706) (0.2795) (0.1415)
Average Airfare (LCC<0.5) 253.3678 260.7447 184.6252
(100.4246) (108.9356) (48.6968)
Market Share (LCC>0.5) 0.0651 0.1253 0.8061
(0.085) (0.1049) (0.1383)
Average Airfare (LCC>0.5) 183.976 194.2192 173.3181
(36.0475) (47.3703) (36.786)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses, LCC¡0.5(¿0.5) denotes the type of market with
LCC rivals total market share less (greater) than 0.5 on leisure overlapping routes.
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Table 1.21: Firms’ Responses to the
Merger on Leisure Routes with Market
Share of LCC Rivals less than 0.5
(Average Airfare)
ln(fare)
Leisure Routes
Merge Legacy LCC
t0 − 4 -0.0448* 0.0289 0.111*
(0.0199) (0.0196) (0.0474)
t0 − 3 -0.0383* 0.0121 0.0663
(0.0186) (0.0212) (0.0368)
t0 − 2 -0.0371 0.0135 0.112**
(0.0224) (0.0309) (0.0427)
t0 − 1 -0.0190 0.120*** 0.221***
(0.0318) (0.0250) (0.0416)
t0 -0.0153 0.108*** 0.261***
(0.0340) (0.0278) (0.0507)
t0 + 1 -0.0690* 0.102** 0.227***
(0.0302) (0.0317) (0.0444)
t0 + 2 -0.0851* 0.107** 0.149***
(0.0431) (0.0368) (0.0421)
t0 + 3 -0.0847 0.112*** -0.0130
(0.0470) (0.0223) (0.0843)
t0 + 4 -0.115* 0.105*** 0.157**
(0.0450) (0.0289) (0.0524)
N 13130 13130 13130
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier fixed effects,
merging firms quarter-of-sample fixed effects, legacy rivals
quarter-of-sample fixed effects, and LCC rivals quarter-of-
sample fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses,
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Table 1.22: Firms’ Responses to the
Merger on Leisure Routes with Market
Share of LCC Rivals greater than 0.5
(Average Airfare)
ln(fare)
Leisure Routes
Merge Legacy LCC
t0 − 4 0.0298 0.0398 -0.0811
(0.0429) (0.0924) (0.0717)
t0 − 3 0.0561 0.107 -0.0557
(0.0702) (0.0683) (0.0715)
t0 − 2 0.110 0.151 -0.0481
(0.0847) (0.0772) (0.0702)
t0 − 1 0.180 0.101 0.00605
(0.0989) (0.0665) (0.0730)
t0 0.129 0.0199 0.0141
(0.0893) (0.0740) (0.0815)
t0 + 1 0.194 0.0578 -0.0108
(0.111) (0.0918) (0.0823)
t0 + 2 0.215 0.0382 -0.0644
(0.152) (0.0979) (0.0847)
t0 + 3 0.281 0.0464 -0.0830
(0.186) (0.101) (0.0714)
t0 + 4 0.210 0.0512 -0.0277
(0.174) (0.0916) (0.0800)
N 4329 4329 4329
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier fixed effects,
merging firms quarter-of-sample fixed effects, legacy rivals
quarter-of-sample fixed effects, and LCC rivals quarter-of-
sample fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses,
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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Chapter 2
Multimarket Contact and Price
Dispersion
2.1 Introduction
Well-developed industries often have firms competing against each other in
multiple markets. This multimarket contact is a concern for both academic and
government economists due to the issue of mutual forbearance; when firms hesitate
to apply aggressive competitive strategies in one market for fear of retaliation in
other markets in which they compete. Restrained behaviors of overlapping firms due
to multimarket contact could facilitate tacit collusion, such as setting higher prices
or price discriminating across consumer groups.
Given the potential for multimarket contact to reduce competition, many stud-
ies have investigated how multimarket contact affects price levels.1 However, no the-
oretical or empirical literature exists on the topic of how such firms adjust prices for
different consumer groups when multimarket contact intensifies. In this paper, I pro-
vide a new theoretical model to predict how a firm’s price dispersion across consumer
1These studies span a variety of industries, including Evans and Kessides (1994), Jans and Rosen-
baum (1997), Parker and Ro¨ller (1997), Waldfogel and Wulf (2006), among others.
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groups changes when firms become cooperative due to an increase in contact. The
model predictions are tested and confirmed using data from the airline industry.
Previous work suggests that competition can either increase or reduce the
degree of price dispersion. Using data from the U.S. airline industry, Borenstein
and Rose (1994) demonstrate a positive effect of competition on price dispersion,
while Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) find a negative effect. Similarly, the magnitude
of price dispersion or price discrimination can be either enhanced or weakened by
an increase in multimarket contact. More specifically, my theoretical model posits
two consumer groups (e.g., business travelers and leisure travelers) that may have
different sensitivities to purchase lower-fare tickets from a rival carrier (cross-price
elasticity). In this model environment, it is possible that price dispersion could be
smaller as firms overlap more. Suppose that business travelers are highly brand-loyal
and leisure travelers are easily attracted by cheap tickets. When multimarket contact
intensifies and firms begin pricing more cooperatively, firms would like to increase
prices more in the previously competitive leisure traveler market than in the less
competitive business traveler market. However, if the difference in the sensitivities
between the two consumer groups falls, business travelers are attracted to the low fares
as much as the leisure travelers are. When firms face greater multimarket contact and
they start colluding, the restriction on firms’ ability to price discriminate consumer
groups is loosened. Thus, firms increase the fares more for business travelers than for
leisure travelers and price dispersion tends to be larger.
Furthermore, as the market moves toward perfect competition, prices are set
close to the marginal cost and both consumer groups are sensitive to the rival firms’
lower prices. This leads to a diminished distinction of sensitivity (cross-price elas-
ticity) between business travelers and leisure travelers to purchase a rival’s low-fare
tickets. In a competitive market, higher multimarket contact could have a more
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significant positive effect on price dispersion than in a non-competitive market.
Using airline data from the 1000 largest routes in the U.S., I test my theoretical
predictions by applying two panel data estimation approaches: ordinary least squares
(OLS) and quantile regression (QR). These empirical models specify how multimarket
contact affects price dispersion with carrier-route fixed effects and time fixed effects.
In the OLS estimation, I perform three comparisons: competitive markets versus con-
centrated markets (or less competitive markets), short hauls versus more competitive
long hauls, and legacy carriers versus low-cost carriers (LCCs). Consistent with the
theoretical predictions, when other carriers enter 10% more routes where a carrier
services, price dispersion increases by 3.05% if this carrier is in a competitive market,
2.33% if this carrier services long haul flights, and 2.07% if this carrier is an LCC.
Their comparison categories, however, exhibit no significant effects from multimarket
contact.
Both price dispersion measures (dependent variables), the Gini log-odds ratio
and fare deviation (the log value of passenger-weighted standard deviation), are not
normally distributed. This characteristic of the data indicates that it is necessary
to use the QR method. Moreover, different quantiles of price dispersion could show
various degrees of competition or collusion. As predicted by the theoretical model,
the results of QR reveal heterogeneous effects of multimarket contact among carriers.
For the 20% of observations (a carrier on a route) with the highest price dispersion, an
increase in multimarket contact significantly increases price dispersion. For the other
80% of observations, multimarket contact has no effect or a slightly negative effect
on price dispersion. More specifically, along the distribution of dependent variables,
when multimarket contact intensifies, the upper quantiles (i.e., carriers on specific
routes with high price dispersion in each quarter) experience significantly positive
effects on price dispersion. However, the middle quantiles (i.e., carriers with price
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dispersion around the medians in each quarter) show significantly negative effects.
The bottom quantiles (i.e., carriers with low price dispersion in each quarter) seem
to exhibit no effects.
This paper builds on the extensive literature on competition and multimarket
contact. Much research has provided consistent findings that intermarket contact
is associated with higher prices (Evans and Kessides, 1994; Singal, 1996; Jans and
Rosenbaum, 1997; Parker and Ro¨ller, 1997; Busse, 2000; Waldfogel and Wulf, 2006;
Bilotkach, 2011; Miller, 2010). Using airline data, Ciliberto and Williams (2014) fill in
the gap of whether this positive correlation between prices and multimarket contact
is explained by collusive behavior. They empirically demonstrate that multimarket
contact facilitates tacit collusion among airlines. However, to my knowledge, no paper
has looked at the effects of contact among firms across markets on price dispersion
or price discrimination.
This study provides both a theoretical and an empirical setting for testing the
effects of multimarket contact on price dispersion or price discrimination. The empiri-
cal analysis gives results consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. The
cross-price elasticity and the difference in the cross-price elasticities across consumer
groups play an important role in determining the impact of multimarket contact on
price dispersion. This is consistent with the findings of Ciliberto and Williams (2014),
who show that the cross-price elasticity is the mechanism by which multimarket con-
tact influences equilibrium price levels. However, their study does not consider how
price dispersion is influenced by multimarket contact through the cross-price elasticity
or the difference in the cross-price elasticities across consumer groups.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
model. The data and measurement of variables are provided in Section 3. Section 4
and 5 illustrate empirical models and empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes.
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2.2 Theoretical Model
Economic theory makes predictions for how the degree of competition in a
market affects a firm’s price dispersion and price discrimination. However, there is no
explicit model to derive how the degree of collusion or connection among firms affects
price dispersion and price discrimination. In this section, based on the work of Stole
(2007) regarding the best-response symmetry in price games, I propose a theoretical
model illustrating the change in price dispersion as the probability of collusion varies
in a market.
Consider duopolists, j = a, b, in one market with two types of consumers, type
1 and type 2. Type 1 is the high type and type 2 is the low type. These two consumer
types have different demand elasticities. Type 1 consumer demand is less elastic than
that of type 2 because type 1 is more brand-loyal. Firms are able to distinguish
between these two types of consumers with some restrictions on products, such as
advance-purchase requirements and nonrefundable low-price goods. Each firm offers
products to both types of consumers and produces the products with a constant
marginal cost of c per unit. Demand for firm j’s output in the market depends
upon the prices offered by each firm for consumer type i : qji (p
a
i , p
b
i). Following Stole
(2007), I assume that these demand functions are symmetric across firms, which
are symmetric to permuting indices a and b. Thus, qi(pi) ≡ qai (pi, pi) ≡ qbi (pi, pi).
Therefore, the market elasticity of demand for consumer type i 2 can be derived as
εmi = −
pi
qi(p)
q′i(p).
2The demand is a firm’s residual demand.
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Moreover, firm a’s own-price elasticity of demand for consumer type i is
εai (p
a
i , p
b
i) = −
pi
qai (p
a
i , p
b
i)
∂qai (p
a
i , p
b
i)
∂pi
.
At the symmetric prices pi = p
a
i = p
b
i , the above equation can be simplified to
εai (p
a
i , p
b
i) = −
pi
qi(pi)
q′i(pi) +
pi
qai (pi)
∂qai (pi, pi)
∂pbi
.
This equation can be rewritten as
εai = ε
m
i + ε
a−cross
i .
Similarly, firm b’s own-price elasticity of demand for consumer type i is
εbi = ε
m
i + ε
b−cross
i ,
where εj−crossi > 0 is the cross-price elasticity of demand at symmetric prices pi.
Hence, the firm’s own-price elasticity of demand for consumer type i in a market can
be decomposed into two parts: the market elasticity and the cross-price elasticity.
The market elasticity measures the sensitivity of the type i consumer to buying the
outside option instead of consuming the good of either firm a or b. Here, the con-
sumer type is assumed to be predetermined and would not change due to product
restrictions imposed by firms. In addition, the cross-price elasticity measures the type
i consumer’s sensitivity to purchasing the rival’s product.
In the symmetric price equilibrium, the non-cooperative duopolists will set
prices across consumer types such that
pj−noni − c
pj−noni
=
1
εmi + ε
j−cross
i
,
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while cooperative duopolists acting as a monopolist will choose prices across consumer
types such that
pj−coopi − c
pj−coopi
=
1
εmi
,
where εm1 < ε
m
2 and ε
j−cross
1 ≤ εj−cross2 . When firms are not cooperative, firm j’s price
markup dispersion across different types of consumers in a market can be written as
pj1 − c
pj1
− p
j
2 − c
pj2
=
pj1 − pj2
pj1p
j
2
c =
1
εm1 + ε
j−cross
1
− 1
εm2 + ε
j−cross
2
.
When firms are cooperative, firm j’s price markup dispersion is
pj1 − c
pj1
− p
j
2 − c
pj2
=
pj1 − pj2
pj1p
j
2
c =
1
εm1
− 1
εm2
.
When the probability of collusion is high and firms move from non-cooperative to
cooperative, the elasticities can be utilized to derive the change in price dispersion 3
(pj−coop1 − pj−coop2 )− (pj−non1 − pj−non2 ) = (
1
εm1
− 1
εm2
)
pj−coop1 p
j−coop
2
c
−
(
1
εm1 + ε
j−cross
1
− 1
εm2 + ε
j−cross
2
)
pj−non1 p
j−non
2
c
.
Ciliberto and Williams (2014) demonstrate that multimarket contact (MMC)
can help facilitate tacit collusion in the airline industry. In the following empirical
analysis, the probability of collusion is represented by MMC.
If firms raise prices for both consumer types by the same amount, then price
dispersion will not be affected, and
(
1
εm1
− 1
εm2
)
pj−coop1 p
j−coop
2
c
= (
1
εm1 + ε
j−cross
1
− 1
εm2 + ε
j−cross
2
)
pj−non1 p
j−non
2
c
,
3In the empirical analysis, the Gini coefficient and fare deviation are measures of the price
dispersion. Appendix A demonstrates that price dispersion pj1 − pj2 is highly correlated with these
two measures.
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1εm1
− 1
εm2
= (
1
εm1 + ε
j−cross
1
− 1
εm2 + ε
j−cross
2
)
pj−non1 p
j−non
2
pj−coop1 p
j−coop
2
.
We can denote
pj−non1 p
j−non
2
pj−coop1 p
j−coop
2
= k, and 0 < k ≤ 1. This equation can be derived as
follows
1
εm1
− 1
εm2
= (
1
εm1 + ε
j−cross
1
− 1
εm2 + ε
j−cross
2
)k,
(1− k)εm2 + εj−cross2
εm2 (ε
m
2 + ε
j−cross
2 )
=
(1− k)εm1 + εj−cross1
εm1 (ε
m
1 + ε
j−cross
1 )
.
We can set
(1−k)εm2 +εj−cross2
εm2 (ε
m
2 +ε
j−cross
2 )
= A and find
εj−cross1 =
(1− k)− εm1 A
A− 1
εm1
= critical point.
To guarantee that firm j’s cross-price elasticity for type 1 consumers is not negative
(i.e., εj−cross1 ≥ 0), then (1−k)−ε
m
1 A
A− 1
εm1
≥ 0. It can be proven as follows that A− 1
εm1
< 0,
A− 1
εm1
=
(1− k)εm2 + εj−cross2
εm2 (ε
m
2 + ε
j−cross
2 )
− 1
εm1
,
A− 1
εm1
=
[(1− k)εm2 + εj−cross2 ]εm1 − εm2 (εm2 + εj−cross2 )
εm1 ε
m
2 (ε
m
2 + ε
j−cross
2 )
,
A− 1
εm1
=
[(1− k)εm1 − εm2 ]εm2 + εj−cross2 (εm1 − εm2 )
εm1 ε
m
2 (ε
m
2 + ε
j−cross
2 )
< 0,
where (1 − k)εm1 − εm2 < 0, εm1 − εm2 < 0, and εm1 εm2 (εm2 + εj−cross2 ) > 0. Therefore,
(1− k)− εm1 A ≤ 0 or A ≥ 1−kεm1 is the condition to make sure the critical point ≥ 0.
When higher MMC causes firms to collude and raise prices more for type 1
consumers than for type 2 consumers, the price dispersion will expand. This incurs
the condition for cross-price elasticity derived as follows,
(
1
εm1
− 1
εm2
)
pj−coop1 p
j−coop
2
c
> (
1
εm1 + ε
j−cross
1
− 1
εm2 + ε
j−cross
2
)
pj−non1 p
j−non
2
c
,
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1εm1
− 1
εm2
> (
1
εm1 + ε
j−cross
1
− 1
εm2 + ε
j−cross
2
)k,
1
εm1
− k
εm1 + ε
j−cross
1
>
1
εm2
− k
εm2 + ε
j−cross
2
,
(1− k)εm1 + εj−cross1
εm1 (ε
m
1 + ε
j−cross
1 )
>
(1− k)εm2 + εj−cross2
εm2 (ε
m
2 + ε
j−cross
2 )
,
(1− k)εm1 + εj−cross1
εm1 (ε
m
1 + ε
j−cross
1 )
> A.
Since A− 1
εm1
< 0, so
εj−cross1 >
(1− k)− εm1 A
A− 1
εm1
,
εj−cross1 > critical point.
If firms raise prices less for type 1 consumers than for type 2 consumers, the
price dispersion will decrease. Following a similar deduction,
(
1
εm1
− 1
εm2
)
pj−coop1 p
j−coop
2
c
< (
1
εm1 + ε
j−cross
1
− 1
εm2 + ε
j−cross
2
)
pj−non1 p
j−non
2
c
,
1
εm1
− 1
εm2
< (
1
εm1 + ε
j−cross
1
− 1
εm2 + ε
j−cross
2
)k,
(1− k)εm1 + εj−cross1
εm1 (ε
m
1 + ε
j−cross
1 )
<
(1− k)εm2 + εj−cross2
εm2 (ε
m
2 + ε
j−cross
2 )
,
(1− k)εm1 + εj−cross1
εm1 (ε
m
1 + ε
j−cross
1 )
< A,
εj−cross1 <
(1− k)− εm1 A
A− 1
εm1
,
εj−cross1 < critical point.
Based on the above analysis, the predictions of the model can be summarized
as follows:
(1) If the equality
(1−k)εm2 +εj−cross2
εm2 (ε
m
2 +ε
j−cross
2 )
=
(1−k)εm1 +εj−cross1
εm1 (ε
m
1 +ε
j−cross
1 )
is satisfied, then the price disper-
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sion of firms will not change as the market moves from competitive to collusive.
(2) However, if firm j’s cross-price elasticity for the high type consumer is greater
than the critical point (i.e., critical point < εj−cross1 ≤ εj−cross2 ), which means
the difference in cross-price elasticities across consumer types is relatively small,
the price dispersion of firms will increase as the market structure changes from
competitive to collusive.
(3) If firm j’s cross-price elasticity for the high type consumer is less than the
critical point and much less than the cross-price elasticity for the low type con-
sumer (i.e., εj−cross1 < critical point < ε
j−cross
2 ), which means the magnitude of
the cross-price elasticities across these two consumer groups is relatively large,
firm j’s price dispersion will decrease as firms become more cooperative.
It is impossible to have a scenario where εj−cross1 ≤ εj−cross2 ≤ critical point.
The proof is as follows. We assume
εj−cross2 ≤ critical point,
εj−cross2 ≤
(1− k)− εm1 A
A− 1
εm1
,
where A− 1
εm1
< 0. Thus,
εj−cross2 (A−
1
εm1
) ≥ (1− k)− εm1 A,
A(εm1 + ε
j−cross
2 )−
εj−cross2
εm1
≥ 1− k.
Substituting A into the above equation,
[(1− k)εm2 + εj−cross2 ](εm1 + εj−cross2 )
εm2 (ε
m
2 + ε
j−cross
2 )
− ε
j−cross
2
εm1
≥ 1− k,
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[(1− k)εm2 + εj−cross2 ](εm1 + εj−cross2 )εm1 − εm2 (εm2 + εj−cross2 )εj−cross2
εm1 ε
m
2 (ε
m
2 + ε
j−cross
2 )
≥ 1− k,
where the denominator is greater than zero. Thus, the equation is transformed to
[(1−k)εm2 +εj−cross2 ](εm1 +εj−cross2 )εm1 −εm2 (εm2 +εj−cross2 )εj−cross2 ≥ (1−k)εm1 εm2 (εm2 +εj−cross2 ),
(1− k)εm1 εm2 (εm1 − εm2 ) + (εj−cross2 )2(εm1 − εm2 ) + εj−cross2 [(εm1 )2 − (εm2 )2] ≥ 0,
where the left-hand side is less than zero due to εm1 < ε
m
2 . So the scenario where
εj−cross1 ≤ εj−cross2 ≤ critical point violates the assumption εm1 < εm2 .
The change in a firm’s price dispersion as the market structure varies depends
upon the difference in the cross-price elasticities across the high and low type con-
sumers in the market. If this difference is relatively large, firms in an oligopolistic
market would already take advantage of this differential when they compete and the
price dispersion would be smaller after the market becomes collusive. On the other
hand, if this difference is relatively small, firms could not use much of the price disper-
sion and price discrimination strategies when they are not cooperative. Nevertheless,
the change in the market structure plays an important role in increasing the price
dispersion. Ciliberto and Williams (2014) also demonstrate the importance of the
cross-price elasticity in determining the impact of multimarket contact on equilib-
rium fare levels. However, they show no evidence of how the cross-price elasticity
or the difference in the cross-price elasticities across consumer groups affects price
dispersion.
Furthermore, if the cross-price elasticities of the high and low type consumers
are assumed to be the same, it can be derived that the price dispersion is a decreasing
convex function over the cross-price elasticities of consumers in a market. This is
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shown by
f(εj−cross) = (
1
εm1 + ε
j−cross −
1
εm2 + ε
j−cross )
p1p2
c
,
where εj−cross = εj−cross1 = ε
j−cross
2 . The first and second derivatives with respect to
εj−cross are
∂f(εj−cross)
∂εj−cross
=
p1p2
c
[(εm2 + ε
j−cross)−2 − (εm1 + εj−cross)−2]+
1
c
(
1
εm1 + ε
j−cross −
1
εm2 + ε
j−cross )(
∂p1
∂εj−cross
p2 +
∂p2
∂εj−cross
p1) < 0,
since εm1 < ε
m
2 , and
∂pi
∂εj−cross < 0.
∂2f(εj−cross)
∂(εj−cross)2
=
2p1p2
c
[(εm1 + ε
j−cross)−3 − (εm2 + εj−cross)−3]+
2
c
(
∂p1
∂εj−cross
p2 +
∂p2
∂εj−cross
p1)[(ε
m
2 + ε
j−cross)−2 − (εm1 + εj−cross)−2]+
1
c
(
1
εm1 + ε
j−cross −
1
εm2 + ε
j−cross )(
∂2p1
∂(εj−cross)2
p2+
2
∂p1
∂εj−cross
∂p2
∂εj−cross
+
∂2p2
∂(εj−cross)2
p1) > 0,
since εm1 < ε
m
2 ,
∂pi
∂εj−cross < 0, and
∂2pi
∂(εj−cross)2 > 0. This relationship is shown in the
following graph.
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Figure 2.1: Price Dispersion is a Convex Function over Cross-price Elasticity
Note: In fact, the price is also a diminishing convex function of the cross-price elasticity and has
a similar curve. Specifically, for high type consumers (type 1 consumers), this function decreases
faster over the cross-price elasticity than for low type consumers (type 2 consumers).
As shown in Figure 2.1, the dispersion in prices charged by a firm across various
consumer groups decreases as the cross-price elasticity εj−cross increases. When the
market becomes monopolistic or cooperative (i.e., εj−cross ≈ 0), price dispersion will
reach the maximum ( 1
εm1
− 1
εm2
)1
c
at point A. However, if the market moves toward
perfectly competitive (i.e., εj−cross ≈ ∞), prices will be close to the marginal cost
for each consumer group and the price differential across groups will be negligible.
Besides extreme scenarios, this figure also illustrates two moderate cases of cross-price
elasticity, εB < εC . Point C indicates a more competitive market or a firm with more
aggressive price competition, such as low-cost carriers in the airline industry, relative
to that of point B. Thus, as the probability of tacit collusion rises due to a tight
interconnection among firms, the increase in price dispersion will be greater and more
significant for firms at point C than firms at point B (i.e., AF<AE). This analysis
reconciles with that of the magnitude between the cross-price elasticities of the high
and low type consumers in a market. As the competition becomes fiercer, a firm’s
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cross-price elasticities of both high and low type consumers will be larger, but the
cross-price elasticity difference between these two consumer groups could be smaller.
This is because price competition forces firms to set prices close to the marginal
cost for both types of consumers. The consumers’ cross-price elasticities increase in
competition, while their market elasticities of demand will be stable regardless of
competitive status.
To test the significant effects of a change in market structure due to multi-
market contact in more competitive situations, the empirical analysis compares com-
petitive markets versus concentrated markets (or less competitive markets), short
hauls versus long hauls, and legacy carriers versus low-cost carriers. It can be pre-
dicted that competitive markets, long hauls (which are more competitive than short
hauls), and LCCs will show more significant effects than their comparison categories
of concentrated markets, short hauls, and legacy carriers.
2.3 Data and Measurement of Variables
The data source for this paper is the Airline Origin and Destination Survey
(DB1B) published by the U.S. Department of Transportation. The DB1B database
is a 10% quarterly sample of all domestic tickets issued by U.S. reporting airlines,
including information on origin, destination and connecting airports, marketing car-
riers, operating carriers, year, quarter, fare, and the number of passengers paying that
fare.4 My study focuses on domestic, direct, and coach-class airline tickets for the
4I applied several common filters often used in the airline economics literature to clean the data
and construct a comparable dataset. Only domestic direct flights are included, which encompasses
both nonstop flights and flights in which there is a stop but no change of airplane. Directionality
is suppressed. A roundtrip itinerary is split into two observations, and the fare is divided by two.
Open-jaw itineraries (where a roundtrip passenger does not return to the origin city) are dropped.
Observations with fares of questionable magnitude are dropped, and bulk fares are eliminated as
well. Fares greater than five times the DOT’s Standard Industry Fare Level (SIFL) are also excluded.
I also dropped all fares that are less than $20 for a one-way trip. Only coach-class tickets are kept.
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year 2017:Q1-Q4. This time period was chosen because several airline mergers and
acquisitions happened in the past 10 years. This caused the airline industry to enter
a tightly oligopolistic era and these few remaining firms kept expanding their network
by opening new routes. The inter-market connection could play an important role in
this scenario.
For each quarter, I include data on only the 1000 largest routes in terms of
passenger volume. Following the approach of Evans and Kessides (1994), I eliminate
airlines that service less than 10 of the largest 1000 routes and less than 1 percent of
passengers on a route. Monopoly routes are dropped due to no contact for carriers
on these routes. Carriers reporting only one level of fares are eliminated since there
is no price differential across consumers. After the data cleaning process, the final
dataset contains 16254 observations from 1073 routes5 and 11 airlines6 for the year
2017.
The unit of observation is a carrier within a route in a given quarter of the
year. Two major dependent variables are constructed to capture the level of price dis-
persion: the Gini coefficient and fare deviation. Following the method of Borenstein
and Rose (1994), the formula for the Gini coefficient can be computed as follows7
GINI = 1− 2× {
N∑
i=1
[
farei × PAXi
total revenue
× (1−
i∑
j=1
PAXj
total PAX
)]},
where N is the number of different fare level tickets reported by a carrier on a route
Coupon types indicating foreign carrier flying between 2 U.S. points are dropped. To deal with the
issue of code sharing, I dropped flights including a change of ticketing carriers and flights in which
the operating and ticketing carriers are different.
5The identity of the 1000 largest routes changes from quarter to quarter, so more than 1000
routes are included in the final sample.
6These 11 airlines include 5 legacy airlines and 6 low-cost carriers (LCC). Legacy airlines are
Alaska, American, Delta, Hawaiian, and United. LCCs are Frontier, Allegiant, Spirit, Sun Country,
Virgin, Southwest.
7There could be a typo or mistake in their formula, so I rewrote it here.
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in a given quarter, farei is the reported fare for the ith ticket, and PAXi is the
reported number of passengers traveling at that fare.
The log value of passenger-weighted standard deviation of fares for a carrier
on a route (hereafter fare deviation) is calculated by the following equation
LogSD = ln [(
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
ωi(farei − fare)) 12 ],
where N and farei are the same as above, ωi is the passenger weight for the ith ticket,
and fare is the passenger-weighted average fare, calculated as fare = 1
N
∑N
i=1 ωifarei.
In addition, following the approaches of Evans and Kessides (1994) and Baum
and Korn (1996), I construct both route-level and carrier-level multimarket contact
indexes to indicate the probability of collusion among firms. The route-level index
captures the extent of multimarket contact among the airlines that service the route,
which is an average number of contact for all carriers on the route. The carrier-level
index of a carrier on a route measures the average market domain overlap with other
carriers, which defines how important other competitors are to this carrier. Both
indexes are based on pairwise comparisons of airline contact. The formulas are as
follows
akl =
n∑
j=1
DkjDlj,
AvgRouteContactj =
1
[fj(fj − 1)/2]
m∑
k=1
m∑
l=k+1
aklDkjDlj,
Route− LevelMMCj = AvgRouteContactj
1000
,
Carrier − LevelMMClj =
∑m
k 6=l aklDkjDlj
(
∑n
j Dlj)(fj − 1)
,
where the time subscript is dropped for now. n and m represent the number of routes
and airlines, respectively, Dkj(Dlj) is a dummy variable that equals one if airline
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k(l) offers flights on route j and zero otherwise, akl measures the number of routes
serviced by both airline k and l concurrently, and fj is the number of carriers on
route j. Another variable I use in my analysis is the negative log of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (− ln (HHI)), which captures the market competition or market
concentration of a route.
Table 2.1 presents the statistics of these five variables from the data sample,
and Figures 2.2 and 2.3 plot the histograms and quantiles of both price dispersion
variables, the Gini coefficient and fare deviation. Different from the other three
variables (Route-level MMC, Carrier-level MMC, and ln(HHI)), the distributions of
both the Gini coefficient and fare deviation are not likely to be normal. 75% of
observations with Gini coefficient are less than 0.31 and these with fare deviation
are smaller than 2.52. This characteristic of the dependent variables shows it is
inappropriate to merely use OLS estimation for panel data. This is because mean
regression masks this heterogeneity. Thus, I will apply QR in the empirical analysis
to capture how multimarket contact influences price dispersion differently with the
change in price dispersion.
In addition to this feature of the data, Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) demonstrate
that an increase in competition over time along a route results in a decrease in price
dispersion in the airline industry. Their conclusion is consistent with textbook theory,
which states that as the market moves toward perfect competition, the dispersion in
prices charged by an individual firm in a given market will fall. In the QR approach,
different quantiles of the response variable could show various degrees of competition
or collusion. The ambiguous effects of multimarket contact can be identified based
on different level of market competition.
Table 2.2 partitions all the carriers into subsamples by the 30th, 60th, and
90th percentiles of carrier-level multimarket contact index. The means and medians
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of the Gini coefficient seem to be increasing as the carrier-level MMC of firms rises.
However, this pattern is inconsistent with the trend shown in the fare deviation, which
presents negligible growth in price dispersion as multimarket contact enhances. The
price dispersion even drops to its smallest value in the most interdependent group.
This suggests that the relationship between multimarket contact and price dispersion
may not be linear, as shown in the former theoretical predictions.
2.4 Empirical Models
According to the theoretical predictions, multimarket contact can either in-
crease or decrease the price dispersion as the market moves from competitive to
collusive. This section explores empirically how multimarket contact influences price
dispersion with the U.S. airline market.
The analysis follows the estimation strategy in Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), but
adds a multimarket contact variable to the regression model. The basic specification
is as follows:
ycrt = α + β1MMCcrt + β2(− ln (HHIrt)) +Xrtθ + γt + ϑcr + crt,
where ycrt represents a firm’s price dispersion. This is expressed by the Gini log-odds
ratio, given by Gloddcrt = ln [GINIcrt/(1−GINIcrt)], and the fare deviation for carrier
c on route r in time t. There are two fixed effects included here: time fixed effects
and carrier-route fixed effects, denoted by γt and ϑcr, respectively. − ln (HHIrt) is
the negative value of the natural log of route r’s Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in time
t. The key variable of interest, MMCcrt is the carrier-level multimarket contact
for carrier c on route r in time t. Higher levels of multimarket contact have been
shown theoretically and empirically to increase the probability of collusion for the
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carrier on that route. Xrt controls for route characteristics and costs including the
nonstop distance, the slot-controlled airport,8 the competition from Southwest, the
competition from other LCCs, the market share of Southwest, and the market share
of other LCCs. In OLS estimation, the standard errors are clustered at the carrier-
route level to account for heteroscedasticity and correlation across observations for a
particular carrier-route combination over time.
I apply two estimation strategies for panel data: OLS and QR. Given that
the effects of multimarket contact can depend upon the characteristics of the market,
the average effects obtained from OLS estimation may be somewhat misleading. QR
estimation helps better explore how the impact of multimarket contact differs across
markets.
The QR model characterizes various quantiles along the price dispersion dis-
tribution, which consists of these price dispersions of firms. This model is given by:
ycrt = β1τMMCcrt + β2τ (− ln (HHIrt)) + γtτ + ϑcrτ + crtτ,
where 0 < τ < 1 indicates the price dispersion below the quantile τ . The conditional
quantile function τ [·] is specified as:
τ [ycrt|MMCcrt,− ln (HHIrt), γtτ , ϑcrτ ] = β1τMMCcrt+β2τ (− ln (HHIrt))+γtτ +ϑcrτ ,
where each estimated coefficient measures the effect of the corresponding regressors
on ycrt at the τth quantile of ycrt. For instance, a coefficient on MMCcrt at τ = 0.5
measures the effect of an increment of carrier-level multimarket contact on price
dispersion at the 50th quantile of the conditional price dispersion distribution.
8The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) uses runway slots to limit scheduled air traffic at
certain capacity constrained airports. These airports include John F. Kennedy International Airport
(JFK), LaGuardia Airport (LGA), and Ronald Reagan National Airport (DCA).
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I adopt the method introduced by Powell (2016), which is a QR approach
for panel data with nonadditive fixed effects. The traditional method with additive
fixed effects changes the structural quantile function and the conditional outcome
distribution. However, this approach with nonadditive fixed effects maintains the
nonseparable disturbance term commonly associated with quantile estimation. A
further advantage is that this approach permits an unspecified distribution for the
data generating process of the outcome variable.
2.5 Empirical Analysis
Both OLS and QR results are presented and compared in this section. For
the QR, inspection of the draw sequences confirms that the coefficients converge after
5000 iterations. The results indicate that the algorithm can recover the parameters
sufficiently. I run the estimation with 10000 iterations for each quantile and discard
the first 1000 runs as a burn-in. I use the last 9000 iterations in an MCMC (Markov
Chain Monte Carlo) simulation to estimate the model’s parameters.
2.5.1 OLS Panel Estimations
Table 2.3 contains estimation results for both price and price dispersion mod-
els. Before discussing the focus of this study, the multimarket contact effect, I will
look at the control variables. Consistent with previous work, the effects of an increase
in competition, measured by the market concentration -ln(HHI), on price and price
dispersion are negative and significant. Four variables are included to represent the
effects of LCCs: the presence of Southwest and other LCCs, and the market share of
Southwest and other LCCs. In contrast with the work of Brueckner et al. (2013), only
the presence of Southwest reduces fares and fare dispersions. The presence of other
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LCCs is generally associated with higher price levels and greater price dispersion.
As shown in Table 2.3, consistent with the conclusions of Evans and Kessides
(1994), multimarket contact increases carriers’ passenger-weighted average fares. As
contact increases by one standard deviation (0.1298), the fare increases by about
2.54%9. Additionally, the price dispersion regressions reveal that routes with greater
MMC have significantly higher price dispersion on average.
To begin investigating differences across markets in the effects of multimarket
contact on price dispersion, I decompose the whole sample by market competition,
route nonstop distance, and carrier type. When the market moves toward perfect
competition, the dispersion in prices charged by an individual firm in a given market
will fall. This indicates that the difference between the cross-price elasticities of the
high and low type consumers becomes smaller when competition is stronger. Gerardi
and Shapiro (2009) mention that there is a positive correlation between the distance
of a route and the degree of competition. In my data, I find the same pattern as
well. As the log value of nonstop distance moves from less than the 25th percentile
to greater than the 75th percentile, the average number of effective competitors rises
from 4.1 to 6.1.10 The reason for distinguishing legacy carriers and LCCs is that they
have different business models and pricing strategies. Legacy carriers adopt the hub-
and-spoke network, while LCCs use the point-to-point operating practice. Usually,
the average fares of LCCs are lower than those of legacy carriers. In my dataset, the
average and median fares of LCCs are around $166, but about $230 for legacy carriers.
This suggests that there could be a higher proportion of price elastic consumers as
more LCCs compete in the market.
9exp(0.179)-1)*0.1298
10Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) use the effect of route density to explain the source of this positive
relationship between competition and distance. With a few exceptions, large cities in the United
States tend to be relatively far from each other. The demand for air travel increases with the
populations of endpoints, so more carriers would like to provide flight services.
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Table 2.4 shows the mean and median price dispersion by market, distance,
and carrier. For both market and distance categories, I use the median values of
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and logarithm of nonstop distance as the criteria to
decompose the whole sample into either competitive markets (HHI<median) or con-
centrated markets (HHI>median), and either short hauls (distance<median) or long
hauls (distance> median).11 Both concentrated markets and short haul flights tend
to have larger price dispersion than competitive markets and long haul flights. How-
ever, legacy carriers and LCCs show a negligible difference in price dispersion. This
might suggest that as the airline industry evolves, LCCs gain the ability to engage
in price dispersion or price discrimination to some extent, while the legacy carriers
always have this ability. In the following subsections, I compare the carrier-level
multimarket contact effects on price dispersion in these partitioned samples.
2.5.1.1 Competitive Markets VS Concentrated Markets
The first column of Table 2.5 shows the regression results for competitive
markets with HHI less than its median value in the sample. The coefficient of MMC
is significantly positive. In the second column, we see an insignificant coefficient
of MMC for the concentrated markets. Thus, the more contacts for a carrier with
other firms in competitive markets, the higher the price dispersion than a carrier
in concentrated markets. The obvious disparity of the MMC coefficients in these
two estimations is likely a consequence of the larger cross-price elasticities of both
high (business travelers or brand-loyal customers) and low (leisure travelers or non-
brand-loyal customers) type consumers in competitive markets than in concentrated
markets, which is shown in Figure 2.1. With an increase in multimarket contact,
11This median value threshold is not critical, as the summary statistics (Table 2.4) and later
regressions (Tables 2.5 and 2.6) are not sensitive to it.
75
a firm in the comparatively competitive market increases its price dispersion more
significantly as the market structure moves toward more cooperative. Additionally,
according to prediction (2) of the theoretical model, the positive effects of MMC in
competitive markets also indicate that the differential between cross-price elasticities
of high and low type consumers should be relatively small.
Table 2.5 also shows that the effects of negative market competition and South-
west presence are stronger in concentrated markets than in competitive markets. This
makes sense due to the smaller number of competitors in concentrated markets. The
marginal effects of an increase in competition could be stronger in concentrated mar-
kets, either from the decrease in market concentration or Southwest joining in the
market.
Statistics show that the mean of the market share of other LCCs in competitive
markets is 19%, which is more than twice the average of 8% in concentrated markets.
This disparity in average market share seems to reveal that the effects of the presence
of other LCCs are stronger in competitive markets. However, at the levels of average
market share for both types of markets, the net impact of other LCCs is 0.112 for
competitive markets and 0.0913 for concentrated markets. These two net affects are
fairly similar.
2.5.1.2 Short Hauls VS Long Hauls
The results of short hauls versus long hauls are shown in Table 2.6. The
pattern of multimarket contact effects on price dispersion is similar to the one with
competitive markets versus concentrated markets. This is because routes with longer
distances tend to be relatively more competitive than routes with shorter distances.
120.0925 ∗ 0.19 + 0.0830
130.474 ∗ 0.08 + 0.0490
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Thus, as shown in Figure 2.1, the cross-price elasticities for both high and low type
consumers in long haul markets are likely to be greater than in short haul markets.
This distinction of cross-price elasticity of demand across short and long hauls leads
to the different effects of MMC as markets switch to a more collusive structure. Like
the results in the competitive markets versus concentrated markets, the significantly
positive effects of MMC in long hauls imply the difference in cross-price elasticity
across high and low type consumers is relatively small according to the prediction
(2).
As seen in Table 2.6, the competition effects measured by -ln(HHI) are similar
on both short and long haul routes. An incremental increase in -ln(HHI) decreases
price dispersion by around 10%.
In contrast to the results in Table 2.5, although markets with long distance
flights are more competitive than markets with short distance flights, competition
from Southwest demonstrates more robust effects in long haul flights than in short
haul flights. At the average levels of Southwest market share, that is, 43% for short
hauls and 23% for long hauls, the net competitive effects from Southwest are even
much stronger in long haul markets. However, the coefficients of the presence of other
LCCs are close in both short and long haul regressions. As the market shares of other
LCCs rise to the average levels, which are 13% for short haul routes and 14% for long
haul routes, the net effects of other LCCs are still roughly close at 0.09 for short hauls
and 0.07 for long hauls.
As illustrated in Tables 2.5 and 2.6, both coefficients of Southwest market
share and other LCCs market share present a pattern of more substantial effects in
the less competitive (short haul) routes than in the competitive (long haul) routes.
The market share of LCCs could be related to the fraction of price-sensitive consumers
to some extent, due to their low-fare strategy. Thus, the fraction of brand-loyal or
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high type consumers falls as this market share grows. According to switching cost
theory (Klemperer, 1987a; Hastings, 2004), under price competition, firms’ optimal
price increases in the share of its brand-loyal consumers and its competitors’ share
of brand-loyal consumers, but decreases in the share of non-brand-loyal consumers.
Therefore, as the market share of LCCs rises, rival firms tend to drop fares for both
price-insensitive and price-conscious travelers. But if the optimal fares for price-
insensitive consumers drop less than the fares for price-conscious consumers, then the
price dispersion could expand. This effect can be more clear in a market with a more
distinct difference in the cross-price elasticity for the high and low type consumers,
as in concentrated markets and short hauls markets.
2.5.1.3 Legacy Carriers VS Low Cost Carriers
The results for legacy carriers versus LCCs are reported in Table 2.7. Col-
umn (1) only uses the observations of legacy carriers as a subsample, while column
(2) just includes the LCCs observations as a subsample. Similar to the above two
comparisons, the pattern of the coefficients of the MMC variable in both columns
is consistent with the theoretical predictions illustrated in Figure 2.1. Multimarket
contact significantly increases the price dispersion of LCCs, but shows no significant
effects on the price dispersion of legacy carriers. LCCs, unlike legacy carriers, ap-
ply cheap pricing strategies with no-frills passenger experience and charge plenty of
fees for such luxuries as additional bags or extra legroom. This low-fare policy likely
implies that consumers buying tickets from an LCC rather than a legacy carrier are
attracted mostly by cheap fares. This means that the cross-price elasticity of demand
for LCCs is relatively higher than that of legacy carriers. Consequently, when firms
engage in tacit collusion, the change in price dispersion is larger and more significant
for LCCs than legacy carriers. Additionally, the incremental effects of MMC on the
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price dispersion of LCCs indicate the small difference between cross-price elasticities
of high and low type consumers, consistent with the prediction (2).
As seen in Table 2.7, both coefficients of ln(HHI) in the legacy carriers and
LCCs regressions are around -12%. Southwest has a larger competitive effect on LCCs
(i.e., -0.284) than on legacy carriers (i.e., -0.153), and the net competitive effect is
stronger (i.e., -0.357 on LCCs and -0.0959 on legacy carriers) at the average level of
Southwest market share of 33%. This trend suggests that Southwest competes more
aggressively with other LCCs than with legacy carriers. In contrast, the presence of
other LCCs displays positive effects on the price dispersion of both LCCs and legacy
carriers. When the market share of other LCCs rises to its average level of 14%, the
net effects on legacy carriers increase to 0.09 while the net effects on LCCs decrease
to 0.06.
An incremental increase in the market share of LCCs shrinks the dispersion of
prices charged by an LCC, but expands the dispersion of prices charged by a legacy
carrier. The market share of Southwest illustrates a similar magnitude for both
legacy carriers and LCCs. However, the market share of other LCCs has a positive
effect on legacy carriers that is more than double its negative effect on LCCs. As
previously mentioned, the market share of LCCs could be related to the fraction of
price-sensitive consumers. The conclusions here are consistent with the above results,
which are explained by the switching cost theory that rival carriers tend to drop
optimal fares for price-sensitive travelers as the market share of LCCs rises. Usually,
legacy carriers have more differentiated consumer groups than LCCs. Thus, when
the percentage of price-elastic consumers increases, a legacy carrier is able to keep its
optimal fares for the high type consumers somewhat stable, but reduces fares for the
low types. On the other hand, an LCC may have to drop fares more for high type
consumers, leading to a reduction in price dispersion.
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2.5.2 Quantile Regressions
Quantile regression estimates for the full sample of the Gini log-odds ratio and
fare deviation at a select few values of τ(0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90) are presented
in Tables 2.8 and 2.9. Different from the OLS panel estimates in Table 3, MMC
shows significantly negative and positive effects as well as zero effects as the quantile
of dependent variables moves. It seems that the mean effects of MMC (0.128 in the
Gini log-odds ratio regression and 0.271 in the fare deviation regression) reported by
the OLS estimation reflect the effects observed for the 80th quantile of both dependent
variables’ distributions. About 20% of the observations (a carrier on a route) with the
highest price dispersion show that multimarket contact significantly increases price
dispersion, but for the other 80% of the observations, multimarket contact displays
no effect or a slightly negative effect on price dispersion. However, the effect of an
increase in competition (-ln(HHI)) on price dispersion is greatly consistent with the
mean effect presented by the OLS regression.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 plot all 99 point estimates of MMC and -ln(HHI) by
quantiles of the Gini log-odds ratio and fare deviation from τ = 0.01 to τ = 0.99.
These estimates of -ln(HHI) consistently move around the OLS estimate. However,
the point estimates of MMC by quantiles display a distinctive pattern in both plots.
In the bottom quantiles of the Gini log-odds ratio (τ = 0− 0.30) and fare deviation
(τ = 0 − 0.39), multimarket contact shows no effects on price dispersion. In the
middle quantiles (τ = 0.30 − 0.6 for the Gini log-odds ratio and τ = 0.39 − 0.54 &
τ = 0.68 − 0.77 for the fare deviation), the effects are negative. The effects change
to positive when moving to the upper quantiles, at τ = 0.80 − 0.90 for the Gini
log-odds ratio and τ = 0.84 − 0.95 for the fare deviation. This pattern of MMC
point estimates illustrates the potential for heterogeneous effects as predicted by the
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theoretical model.
By applying the method of Powell (2016), the quantile regressions control for
individual fixed effects and time fixed effects with nonadditive fixed effects. However,
the individual fixed effects are not included or even estimated in this de-meaning
approach. Thus, to recover those dependent variables corresponding to the bottom,
middle, and upper quantiles, I check the unconditional distributions of both the Gini
log-odds ratio and fare deviation in each quarter. By comparing the unconditional
quantiles with the quantiles conditional on regressors, I find that the gap could be
considered negligible. Therefore, it is reasonable to utilize the unconditional distri-
butions.
Based on these recovered quantiles of the dependent variables from their un-
conditional distributions in each quarter, I calculate the statistics of several variables.
Table 10 presents the statistics for the Gini coefficient, fare deviation, carrier-level
MMC, HHI, nonstop distance, market share of LCCs, and presence of LCC by the
bottom, middle, and upper quantile ranges. On average, as the quantile range moves
from bottom to middle and to upper, both price dispersion variables (the Gini coef-
ficient and fare deviation) increase.
In Table 2.10, both means and medians of LCC market share and presence
of LCC are lower for middle quantiles compared to other two quantile ranges, which
to some extent indicates that firms have a small fraction of price-sensitive consumers
and weak competition from LCCs. This may reveal that firms in the middle quantile
range face high and low type consumer groups with a larger difference in their cross-
price elasticities. Without the strong price competition from LCCs, firms in the
middle quantile range are capable of price discriminating consumers with certain
ticket restrictions. According to prediction (3) of the theoretical model, the price
dispersion of firms will decrease as the market moves from competitive toward tacitly
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collusive if the critical point is in the middle of cross-price elasticity of high and low
type consumers, which explains the case for the middle quantiles.
For both bottom and upper quantiles in Table 2.10, besides the high market
share of LCCs and high presence of LCCs, there seems to be no other significant
pattern. The difference in cross-price elasticity across consumer groups in the bottom
quantile range probably satisfies the equality condition stated in prediction (1). Thus,
when firms become more cooperative, there could be no significant effects of MMC.
However, this effect turns to be positive if the difference in cross-price elasticity across
consumer groups is small as in prediction (2), which corresponds to the results for
the upper quantiles.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper examines price dispersion of firms across consumer types when the
probability of collusion, represented by the carrier-level multimarket contact, becomes
higher. The theoretical model constructed in this study predicts effects of multimar-
ket contact. Specifically, multimarket contact could help the price dispersion of a
firm if the difference in cross-price elasticities of the high and low type consumers is
relatively small. However, multimarket contact could hurt the price dispersion of a
firm if this difference is relatively large. In addition, if the cross-price elasticities of
the high and low type consumers are assumed to be the same, the price dispersion is
proved to be a decreasing convex function of the cross-price elasticity. Therefore, as
the cross-price elasticity or competition increases, price dispersion is smaller. Nev-
ertheless, the change in price dispersion could be larger and more significant for a
more competitive market or a firm when firms become cooperative due to intensified
multimarket contact.
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The empirical analyses presented by the OLS panel estimations and QR are
consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. I perform three comparisons
that decompose markets or carriers of different types: competitive markets versus
concentrated markets, short hauls versus long hauls, and legacy carriers versus low-
cost carriers. The results show significant positive effects of multimarket contact
in the cases of competitive markets, long haul flights, and low-cost carriers. These
three groups are believed to have relatively larger cross-price elasticities across both
the high and low type consumers than their comparison categories of concentrated
markets, short haul flights, and legacy carriers. Moreover, the QR for panel data
with nonadditive fixed effects provide further evidence on the heterogeneous effects
of multimarket contact. These effects vary from zero effects to negative effects to
positive effects as the quantile of the dependent variables (the Gini log-odds ratio
and fare deviation) moves from low quantiles to high quantiles. The reasons for
this pattern are explained by the differences in the cross-price elasticity across the
consumer types, as illustrated in the predictions of the theoretical model.
In addition to the significant heterogeneous effects of multimarket contact on
price dispersion, there is also surprising evidence shown by competition from low-cost
carriers, including Southwest and other LCCs. Consistent with the work of Morrison
(2001), Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), and Brueckner et al. (2013), the presence
of Southwest still presents strong competitive effects on fare dispersion. However,
inconsistent with the studies of Dresner et al. (1996) and Brueckner et al. (2013), the
presence of other LCCs reveals significant noncompetitive effects on price dispersion.
Furthermore, the effects of LCC market share on price dispersion, a topic not studied
by previous papers, show opposite coefficients for legacy carriers and LCCs. As the
LCC market share rises, the fare dispersion of a legacy carrier expands, while the
price dispersion of an LCC shrinks. Future research on the source of these various
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effects by LCCs is necessary.
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Figure 2.2: Histograms of Gini Coefficient and Fare Deviation
Figure 2.3: Quantile Plots of Gini Coefficient and Fare Deviation
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Figure 2.4: Quantile Regression Point Estimates by Quantiles of Gini Log-odds Ratio
Figure 2.5: Quantile Regression Point Estimates by Quantiles of Fare Deviation
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
stats GINI Fare Deviation Route-level MMC Carrier-level MMC -ln(HHI)
N 16254 16254 16254 16254 16254
p25 0.2265 1.0213 0.3494 0.6329 -8.8665
mean 0.2845 1.8644 0.4643 0.7169 -8.5458
median 0.2606 1.7991 0.4702 0.7172 -8.5222
p75 0.3091 2.5220 0.5454 0.8132 -8.2468
std. dev. 0.0964 1.0248 0.1447 0.1300 0.3933
min 0.1120 -1.9356 0.005 0.01832 -9.2103
max 0.9439 6.9542 0.793 1 -7.5448
Table 2.2: Mean and Median Price Dispersion by Carrier-Level MMC Subsample
Mean Median
GINI Fare Deviation GINI Fare Deviation
MMC<30th percentile 0.2611 1.7761 0.2482 1.7106
30th percentile<MMC<60th percentile 0.2831 1.9218 0.2584 1.8689
60th percentile<MMC<90th percentile 0.2982 1.9496 0.2692 1.9316
MMC>90th percentile 0.3081 1.4864 0.2802 1.0575
All carriers 0.2839 1.8544 0.2605 1.7932
Note: This table reports the mean and median Gini coefficient and fare deviation of domestic coach-class fares for different
subsets of the data, which are partitioned by the 30th, 60th, and 90th percentiles of the carrier-level MMC index.
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Table 2.3: OLS Panel Estimates of Price and Price
Dispersion Models
(1) (2) (3)
ln (fare) LogSD Gloddcrt
MMC 0.179*** 0.271*** 0.128**
(0.0447) (0.100) (0.0646)
-ln(HHI) -0.0947*** -0.614*** -0.121***
(0.0197) (0.0519) (0.0285)
Southwest Mkt Share 0.0837* 0.178 0.0458
(0.0475) (0.138) (0.0734)
Southwest -0.142*** -0.227*** -0.179***
(0.0447) (0.0836) (0.0460)
Other LCC Mkt share -0.0356 0.167 0.187***
(0.0427) (0.122) (0.0656)
Other LCC 0.0332*** 0.0988*** 0.0552***
(0.00988) (0.0236) (0.0155)
Nonstop Distance 0.696*** 1.684*** 1.083***
(0.170) (0.505) (0.280)
Constant -0.469 -15.24*** -9.529***
(1.207) (3.571) (1.980)
Observations 16254 16254 16254
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier fixed effects and time fixed effects. Standard
errors in parentheses, ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 2.4: Mean and Median Price Dispersion by Market, Distance, and Carrier Subsamples
GINI Coefficient
stats Competitive Market Concentrated Market Short Haul Long Haul Legacy LCC
N 8124 8130 8130 8124 10378 5876
mean 0.2781 0.2909 0.2956 0.2733 0.2842 0.2851
median 0.2556 0.2652 0.2715 0.2484 0.2596 0.2625
std. dev. 0.0919 0.1002 0.0940 0.0974 0.0983 0.0929
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Table 2.5: Competitive Markets VS Concentrated Markets
Dependent Variable: Gloddcrt
(1) (2)
Competitive Mkts Concentrated Mkts
MMC 0.305*** 0.0637
(0.106) (0.0839)
-ln(HHI) -0.104** -0.221***
(0.0428) (0.0656)
Southwest Mkt Share 0.0391 0.143
(0.115) (0.136)
Southwest -0.179* -0.207***
(0.102) (0.0377)
Other LCC Mkt Share 0.0925 0.474**
(0.0862) (0.148)
Other LCC 0.0830*** 0.0490**
(0.0240) (0.0201)
Nonstop Distance 0.931 1.091***
(1.232) (0.284)
Constant -8.594 -10.30***
(8.884) (2.023)
Observations 8124 8130
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier fixed effects and time fixed effects. Standard errors
in parentheses, ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 2.6: Short Hauls VS Long Hauls
Dependent Variable: Gloddcrt
(1) (2)
Short Hauls Long Hauls
MMC 0.0131 0.233**
(0.0824) (0.0946)
-ln(HHI) -0.106** -0.0981***
(0.0459) (0.0368)
Southwest Mkt Share 0.182* -0.0304
(0.0969) (0.109)
Southwest -0.159*** -0.240**
(0.0502) (0.0979)
Other LCC Mkt Share 0.357*** 0.0743
(0.127) (0.0775)
Other LCC 0.0447** 0.0590**
(0.0196) (0.0248)
Nonstop Distance 0.821*** 1.177
(0.300) (6.240)
Constant -7.148*** -10.58
(1.996) (46.75)
Observations 8130 8124
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier fixed effects and time fixed ef-
fects. Standard errors in parentheses, ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 2.7: Legacy Carriers VS Low-Cost Carriers
Dependent Variable: Gloddcrt
(1) (2)
Legacy Carriers LCCs
MMC 0.0646 0.207**
(0.0839) (0.101)
-ln(HHI) -0.124*** -0.118**
(0.0333) (0.0501)
Southwest Mkt Share 0.173** -0.220*
(0.0877) (0.122)
Southwest -0.153*** -0.284***
(0.0548) (0.0526)
Other LCC Mkt Share 0.390*** -0.165*
(0.0843) (0.0955)
Other LCC 0.0337* 0.0790***
(0.0187) (0.0222)
Nonstop Distance 1.242*** -0.637
(0.272) (0.811)
Constant -10.74*** 2.821
(1.930) (5.692)
Observations 10378 5876
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier fixed effects and time fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 2.8: Quantile Regression Estimates of Price Dispersion Model
Dependent Variable: Gloddcrt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τ=0.10 τ=0.25 τ=0.50 τ=0.75 τ=0.90
MMC -0.00988 -0.0331 -0.0722** 0.0495 0.3348*
(0.0423) (0.0310) (0.0327) (0.0519) (0.1751)
-ln(HHI) -0.0497*** -0.0655*** -0.0647*** -0.0379* -0.2071***
(0.0181) (0.0113) (0.0156) (0.0227) (0.0525)
Observations 16254 16254 16254 16254 16254
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier fixed effects and time fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses,
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
Table 2.9: Quantile Regression Estimates of Price Dispersion Model
Dependent Variable: LogSD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τ=0.10 τ=0.25 τ=0.50 τ=0.75 τ=0.90
MMC -0.0166 0.0777 -0.364*** -0.292*** 0.577**
(0.0591) (0.0812) (0.0900) (0.0964) (0.246)
-ln(HHI) -0.249*** -0.562*** -0.785*** -0.669*** -0.429***
(0.0317) (0.0543) (0.0559) (0.0342) (0.0877)
Observations 16254 16254 16254 16254 16254
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier fixed effects and time fixed effects. Standard errors in paren-
theses, ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 2.10: Statistics by Quantile Ranges of Gloddcrt and LogSD
Gloddcrt stats GINI Fare Deviation MMC HHI Nonstop Distance Mkt Share of LCC Presence of LCC
Bottom Quantiles
N 4877 4877 4877 4877 4877 4877 4877
mean 0.2081 1.4543 0.6902 5222.0150 7.2068 0.4131 0.3771
median 0.2116 1.4008 0.6873 4796.6750 7.3271 0.3533 0
std. dev. 0.0228 0.6242 0.1273 2027.1390 0.5620 0.3341 0.4847
Middle Quantiles
N 4876 4876 4876 4876 4876 4876 4876
mean 0.2542 1.6157 0.7111 5633.0290 6.9852 0.4744 0.3037
median 0.2531 1.6412 0.7095 5161.0060 6.9745 0.4321 0
std. dev. 0.0170 0.7618 0.1298 2141.6080 0.5553 0.3470 0.4599
Upper Quantiles
N 1626 1626 1626 1626 1626 1626 1626
mean 0.3518 2.3034 0.7505 5595.3020 6.9085 0.5007 0.4729
median 0.3509 2.6245 0.7556 5037.6760 6.9012 0.4679 0
std. dev. 0.0279 1.1021 0.1280 2162.4890 0.5504 0.3446 0.4994
LogSD
Bottom Quantiles
N 6338 6338 6338 6338 6338 6338 6338
mean 0.2527 0.8644 0.7238 5378.9120 6.8834 0.4844 0.5497
median 0.2451 0.8743 0.7144 4889.5400 6.9048 0.4462 1
std. dev. 0.0544 0.3422 0.1423 2193.3860 0.5861 0.3382 0.4976
Middle Quantiles
N 4946 4946 4946 4946 4946 4946 4946
mean 0.2623 2.0764 0.7019 5443.9880 7.1504 0.4434 0.2608
median 0.2529 2.2405 0.7040 4983.4710 7.1763 0.3851 0
std. dev. 0.0626 0.4219 0.1211 2050.5310 0.5219 0.3412 0.4391
Upper Quantiles
N 1785 1785 1785 1785 1785 1785 1785
mean 0.3689 3.2316 0.7330 6331.1990 6.9741 0.4815 0.2308
median 0.3482 3.1998 0.7476 5855.2500 6.9460 0.4368 0
std. dev. 0.0981 0.2475 0.1245 2305.0140 0.6033 0.3807 0.4215
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Appendix A Relationship between Price Disper-
sion and the Gini Coefficient and Fare
Deviation
This appendix tests whether the price dispersion (pj1 − pj2) used in the theo-
retical model is positively related to the price dispersion variables for the empirical
analysis, the Gini coefficient and fare deviation (LogSD). Two measures are used to
calculate the price dispersion: (1) PD1=pj75 − pj25, and (2) PD2=pj90 − pj10.The term
pj25 (p
j
75, p
j
10, p
j
90) is the 25th (75th, 10th, 90th) percentile fare charged by carrier j on
a route. Figure A1 shows that the distributions of both measures are similar to the
distribution of the Gini coefficient in Figure 2.2. These distributions are not normal
and have long right-tails. The pool data depict that price dispersion is positively cor-
related with the Gini coefficient and fare deviation in Figures A2 and A3. As shown
in Table A1, the price dispersion variables (PD1 and PD2) are much larger than the
Gini coefficient and fare deviation on average, so in the later regressions both PD1
and PD2 are scaled down by 1000.
The following empirical model for panel data is used to test the relationship
between the PD and Gini coefficient and fare deviation
ycrt = α + βPD + γt + ϑcr + crt.
This specification is similar to the model in the OLS panel estimation. The variable
ycrt is expressed by the Gini coefficient and fare deviation for carrier c on route r in
time t. There are two fixed effects included here: time fixed effects and carrier-route
fixed effects, denoted by γt and ϑcr, respectively. The variable PD includes PD1 and
PD2. The standard errors are clustered at the carrier-route level.
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The results of this model are illustrated in Table A2. Both PD1 and PD2
variables have significantly positive coefficients in the Gini coefficient and fare devi-
ation regressions. At the statistical level of 0.1%, both price dispersion variables are
positively correlated with the Gini coefficient and fare deviation.
Figure A1: Histograms of PD1 and PD2
Figure A2: Correlation between PD1 and Price Dispersion Measures for Pool Data
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Figure A3: Correlation between PD2 and Price Dispersion Measures for Pool Data
Table A1: Summary Statistics
stats PD1 PD2 GINI Fare Deviation
N 16254 16254 16254 16254
mean 114.6757 224.3947 .2845 1.8644
median 106.75 212.5 .2606 1.7991
std. dev. 62.3216 106.0266 .09635 1.0248
min .5 .5 .11204 -1.9356
max 2095 2095 .94391 6.9542
Table A2: Test of Relatonship
GINI LogSD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PD1
1000
0.589*** 5.226***
(0.0227) (0.168)
PD2
1000
0.302*** 3.398***
(0.0143) (0.0975)
Observations 16254 16254 16254 16254
Note: Fixed effects include route-carrier fixed effects and time fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses, ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
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